<frr*iK    -• 


Ifil 


MWi, 


, 

\^ 

fe^ 


A  TEEATISE 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THREE  ARMS 


INFANTRY,  ARTILLERY,  AND  CAVALRY. 


BY 

FRANCIS    J.    LIPPITT, 

EX-COLONEL   SECOND   INFANTRY,    CALIFORNIA    VOLUNTEERS. 


NEW  YORK: 

D.   VAN   NOSTRAND,    PUBLISHER, 

192    BROADWAY. 

1865. 


L5- 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1865, 

BY  D.  VAN  NOSTKAND, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  tht 
Southern  District  of  New  York. 


Ai:.yOBn;  PRINTER. 


TO  THE  MILITARY  PUBLIC. 


THE  AUTHOR  would  feel  obliged  for  any  facts 
or  suggestions  which  might  enable  him  to  render 
a  future  edition  of  this  work  more  valuable. 
PROVIDENCE,  E.  I.,  July,  1865. 


86S956 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Tactical  Use  off  Infantry 3 

I.  ITS  ATTACK,  GENERALLY 4 

II.  FORMATIONS  FOR  ATTACK % 8 

III.  THE  ATTACK,  HOW  MADE 19 

IV.  BAYONET  CHARGES .  24 

V.  DEFENCE  AGAINST  INFANTRY 27 

VI.  DEFENCE  AGAINST  ARTILLERY 34 

VII.  DEFENCE  AGAINST  CAVALRY 36 

VIII.  SQUARES 40 

IX.  SKIRMISHERS 49 

A .  THEIR  USE , 50 

B.  How  POSTED m  53 

C.  How  HANDLED 55 

D.  RULES  FOR  INDIVIDUAL  SKIRMISHERS 56 

Tactical  Use  of  Artillery 59 

I.  How  POSTED  WITH  RESPECT  TO  THE  GROUND 59 

II.  How  POSTED  WITH  RESPECT  TO  OUR  OWN  TROOPS 63 

III.  How  POSTED  WITH  RESPECT  TO  THE  ENEMY 66 

IV.  POSTING  OF  BATTERIES  AND  OF  PIECES  AS  BETWEEN 

THEMSELVES 68 

V.  How  USED 70 

A.  GENERALLY 70 

B.  IN  OFFENSIVE  COMBAT 72 

C.  IN  DEFENSIVE  COMBAT .  75 

D.  AGAINST  INFANTRY 78 

E.  AGAINST  CAVALRY 82 

F.  AGAINST  ARTILLERY 83 

VI.  ITS  FIRE §5 

VII.  ITS  SUPPORTS  . .  a  a 


CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Tactical  Use  of  Cavalry 93 

I.  ITS  FORMATIONS 93 

II.  ITS  STRONG  AND  ITS  WEAK  POINTS 98 

III.  How  POSTED 99 

IV.  ITS  SUPPORTS 104 

V.  How  USED 106 

YI.  How  IT  FIGHTS 109 

VII.  ITS  CHARGE 113 

VIII.  ITS  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY 122 

A.  GENERALLY 122 

B.  ON  SQUARES 124 

IX.  GENERAL  KEMARKS  ..                                               .  127 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 


EVERY  complete  military  force  consists  of 
three  arms,— INFANTRY,  ARTILLERY,  and  CAV 
ALRY. 

In  "battle,  these  three  arms  are  united  ;  and, 
other  things  being  equal,  that  commander  will 
prove  victorious  who  is  best  acquainted  with 
their  combined  use  in  the  field. 

In  order  thoroughly  to  understand  the  proper 
use  of  the  three  arms  combined,  we  must  obvi 
ously  begin  by  learning  the  proper  use  of  each 
of  them  separately. 

Hence  the  importance  of  the  subject  of  the 
present  treatise.  In  discussing  it,  we  shall 
commence  with  the 

TACTICAL  USE  OF  INFANTRY. 

The  subject  will  be  considered  under  the  fol 
lowing  heads  :— 


4     TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THKEE  ARMS. 

I.— ITS  ATTACK,  GENERALLY. 
II. — FORMATIONS  FOR  ATTACK. 
III. — THE"  ATTACK,  "Hc\V  MADE. 
IY. — BAYONET  CHARGES. 
V. — DEFENCE  AGAINST  INFANTRY. 
YI. — DEFENCE  AGAINST  ARTILLERY. 
VII. — DEFENCE  AGAINST  CAVALRY. 
VIII.— SQUARES. 
IX. — SKIRMISHERS. 

I.— Its  Attack,  generally. 

Infantry  attacks  with  its  fire,  or  with  the 
"bayonet.  Which  of  these  is  the  more  effective  3 

1.  The  object  of  an  attack  is  to  destroy  or 
capture  the  hostile  force,  or,  at  least,  to  drive  it 
from  the  field. 

Capturing  the  enemy,  or  driving  him  from 
the  field,  cannot  usually  be  effected  by  merely 
firing  upon  him. 

True,  a  mere  fire  at  a  distance  may  finally 
destroy  him.  But  an  insuperable  objection  to 
this  mode  of  attack  is,  that  while  we  are  killing 
or  disabling  his  men,  he  is  killing  or  disabling 
as  many  of  our  own. 

2.  If  we  fire  from  behind  cover,  our  loss  may 
be  comparatively  small.     But,  in  that  case,  the 


TACTICAL   USE   OF  INFANTRY.  5 

enemy  will  never  remain  for  any  length  of  time 
exposed  to  our  fire.  He  will  either  attack  and 
rout  us  from  our  cover,  or  retire.  And  even  if 
he  did  neither,  his  actual  and  complete  destruc 
tion,  capture,  or  rout,  would  still  require  an 
attack  with  the  bayonet. 

3.  It  follows  that  the  proper  mode  of  attack 
by  infantry  on  infantry  is  with  the  bayonet. 

The  Russian  Suwarrow's  victories  and  repu 
tation  were  won  chiefly  by  his  fierce  bayonet 
attacks,  which  often  effected  great  results,  in 
spite  of  his  ignorance  of  the  art  of  war. 

4.  But  there  are  exceptional  cases  where  in 
fantry  may  properly  use  only  its  fire  ;  as— 

(1.)  When  acting  as  a  support  to  artillery,  it 
should  rarely,  if  ever,  leave  its  position  to  use 
the  bayonet ;  thereby  endangering  the  safety  of 
the  guns  which  it  is  its  first  duty  to  guard.  Its 
function,  in  this  case,  being  purely  defensive,  it 
should  act  by  its  fire  alone. 

(2.)  Against  a  line  of  skirmishers  deployed, 
a  well-directed  fire  will  usually  be  sufficiently 
effective. 

(3.)  In  mountain  warfare,  its  only  practicable 
mode  of  attack  will  sometimes  be  by  its  fire. 

5.  When  both  sides  are  equally  exposed,  the 
actual  attack  with  the  bayonet  should  not  be 


6     TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THEEE  ARMS. 

':  Cpreceded  by  a  distant  musketry  fire  ;  for,  as  in 
•That  case,  our  loss  will  generally  be  equal  to  the 
,  this  fire  will  give  us  no  superiority  in 
charge,  and  the  loss  we  have  sustained  will 
!]be  therefore  entirely  thrown  away. 

6.  Nevertheless,  our  actual  attack  should  "be 
prepared,  when  possible,  by  the  infliction  of 
such  a  loss  on  the  enemy  as  will  make  him  infe- 
rior  to  us  at  the  decisive  moment.     In  war,  the 
object  is  not  to  test  the  comparative  courage  of 
the  combatants,  but  to  beat  the  enemy.      We 
must  never,  therefore,  when  it  can  be  avoided, 
fight  him  on  equal  terms;  and  so,  never  close 
with  him  without  such  a  superiority  in  num 
bers,  position,  or  spirit,  as  will  make  the  chances 

.decidedly  in  our  favor.      If,  without  exposing 
ourselves  to  much  loss,  we  can  inflict  a  consid 
erable  loss  upon  him,  we  shall  render  him  infe 
rior  to  us,  both  by  the  number  of  his  men  we 
-Jhave  disabled,  and  by  the  demoralization  there- 

bv  caused  in  his  ranks. 

•j 

7.  This  preparatory  loss  can  be  most  effect 
ually  inflicted  by  the  fire  of  artillery ;  as,  from 
its  great  superiority  of  range,  it  can  suffer  but 
little,  meanwhile,  from  the  enemy's  infantry  fire. 
Our  attacking  infantry  are  thus  enabled  to  keep 
out  of  the  range  of  the  fuv  of  the  infantry  they 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  INFANTKY.  7 

are  to  attack,  till  the  moment  of  advancing  to 
close. 

8.  When  we  have  no  artillery  disposable  for 
the  purpose,  the  preparatory  effect  may  be  pro 
duced  by  a  well- sustained  fire  of  infantry,  pro 
vided  it  can  find  a  sheltered  position  to  deliver 
it  from ;  or,  by  the  fire  of  a  heavy  line  of  skir 
mishers. 

9.  If  we  can  make  the  infantry  we  wish  to 
attack  engage  in  a  prolonged  fire,  this  will  ex 
haust  them,  and  thus  render  them  inferior  to  us 
in  strength  and  in  spirit,  even  if  we  inflict  on 
them  but  little  loss. .  But  as  our  attacking  in 
fantry  should,  in  the  mean  time,  be  kept  fresh, 
the  preparatory  fire,  in  such  case,  should  not 
devolve  on  the  troops  that  are  to  close  with  the 
enemy. 

10.  One  cause  of  the  indecisimness  of  the  re 
sults  obtained  in  many  of  the  battles  of  the 
late   war,    as   compared   with    the    great    loss 
of  life  on  both  sides,  has  been,  that  the  oppo 
sing  battalions  were  too  often  kept  firing  at  each 
other  at  a  distance,  both  sustaining  nearly  equal 
loss,  until  the  ranks  were  so  weakened  as  to 
disable  either  party  from  making  a  vigorous  and 
decisive  charge.    Or  else,  charges  were  made  on 
the  enemy's  battalions  before  they  had  been 


8  TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THKEE  ARMS. 

shattered  by  artillery ;  so  that  the  attacking 
troops  were  easily  repulsed,  sometimes  with 
great  slaughter. 

II.— Formations  for  Attack. 

1.  Infantry  may  advance  to  attack  in  either 
of  three  ways :  in  column ;   in  line,  marching 
by  the  front ;  and  by  the  flank  ;  that  is,  in  line, 
but  faced  to  a  flank. 

2.  Of  these  three  formations,  the  last  is  un 
doubtedly  the  worst  possible  ;  for— 

(1.)  On  arriving  at  the  enemy,  the  troops  are 
not  concentrated  at  the  point  where  the  struggle 
is  to  be.  As  they  must  come  up  successively, 
they  will  be  crushed  in  detail  by  superior  num 
bers. 

(2.)  Advancing  in  such  a  formation,  they 
would  be  exposed  to  a  destructive  raking  fire 
from  the  enemy' s  guns ;  especially  since  the 
adoption  of  the  new  flank  march  by  fours, 
which  gives  to  rifled  artillery  a  tolerable  mark. 

3.  The  question  is,  then,  between  an  attack 
in  column  and  an  attack  in  line.      Which  is  the 
better  of  the  two  ? 

The  decisive  effect  of  infantry  is  produced  by 
a  rush  on  the  enemy  with  the  bayonet.  The 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   INFANTRY.  9 

chief  elements  of  success  in  this  attack  at  close 
quarters  are,  the  physical  momentum  of  the 
charge,  and  the  powerful  moral  effect  caused  by 
the  swift  approach  of  a  compact  and  orderly 
hostile  mass.  A  charge  in  line  does  not  admit 
of  both  these  elements.  The  advance  of  a  line 
of  one  or  more  battalions,  to  be  united  and  or 
derly,  cannot  be  rapid,  and  thus  has  no  impe 
tus.  Such  a  line,  advancing  swiftly,  especially 
over  uneven  ground,  would  soon  become  so 
broken  and  disunited  as  to  destroy,  in  a  great 
measure,  the  effect,  both  moral  and  physical,  of 
its  charge,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  deprive  the 
attacking  troops  of  that  confidence  which  is  in 
spired  by  the  consciousness  of  moving  together 
in  one  compact,  formidable  mass,  in  which  every 
soldier  feels  himself  fortified  by  the  support  of 
his  comrades. 

4.  On  the  other  hand,  a  column  can  move 
rapidly  without  losing  its  compactness  and  or 
der. 

In  attacking  the  enemy's  line,  a  close  column 
concentrates  successively,  but  rapidly,  a  force 
superior  to  the  enemy  at  the  decisive  point,  and 
can  hardly  fail  to  pierce  the  line  attacked,  if  it 
arrive  with  its  momentum  unchecked. 

In  a  close  column,  there  is  a  real  force  cre- 
1* 


10    TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THKEE  AEMS. 

ated  by  the  pressure  of  the  mass  "behind  on  the 
leading  subdivision,  pushing  it  on  the  enemy, 
and  preventing  it  from  drawing  back  or  stop 
ping  ;  thus  imparting  to  it  somewhat  of  the 
actual  physical  momentum  of  a  mechanical  en 
gine. 

A  close  column  shelters  raw  troops,  and  car 
ries  them  irresistibly  along  with  it. 

A  close  column,  in  case  of  need,  can  rapidly 
extend  its  front  by  deploying. 

It  can  promptly  make  itself  impenetrable  to 
cavalry. 

Finally,  in  a  column,  the  officers  being  seen 
by  the  men,  the  benefit  of  their  example  is  not 
lost. 

The  close  column  would,  therefore,  seem  to 
be  the  best  formation  for  attack. 

5.  Movements  in  line  requiring  that  high 
degree  of  perfection  in  drill  which  can  rarely 
be  attained  by  any  but  regular  troops,  they 
were  accordingly  abandoned  by  the  raw  and 
undisciplined  masses  of  French  soldiers  that  so 
successfully  defended  the  French  Kepublic  from 
invasion  against  the  veteran  armies  of  Europe  ; 
some  of  which  were  led  by  generals  who  had 
served  under  Frederick  the  Great.  Conscious 
of  their  military  inferiority  to  the  enemy,  they 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   INFANTRY.  11 

instinctively  clustered  together  in  close  and 
heavy  columns ;  then  rushed  down  on  the  ene 
my's  line  with  the  force  of  an  avalanche,  often 
carrying  every  thing  before  them.  Thus  was 
inaugurated  that  system  of  attack  in  deep  and 
solid  columns,  which  was  afterwards  so  success 
fully  used  by  Napoleon. 

6.  Close  columns  have  two  defects.     One  is, 
that  they  are  oppressive  and  exhausting  to  the 
men,  especially  in  hot  weather. 

But  this  is  not  a  very  serious  objection  ;  for 
they  are,  or  should  be,  formed  only  when  about 
to  be  used,  and  then  their  work  is  generally 
soon  over. 

7.  The  other  defect,  however,  is  of  so  grave 
a  nature  as,  in  the  opinion  of  some,  to  more 
than  outweigh  their  advantages  ;   and  this  is, 
the  terribly  destructive  effect  upon  them  of  the 
enemy's  artillery  fire,  or  of  that  of  his  sharp 
shooters  ;  for  the  solid  mass  is  an  easy  target, 
into  which   every  shot   is   sure   to   penetrate. 
Many  of  the  missiles  which  would  fly  over  an 
advancing  line,  are  sure  to  fall,  somewhere  or 
other,  in  a  deep  column. 

This  destructive  eifect  was  strikingly  illus 
trated  in  Macdonald'  s  charge  on  the  Allied  cen 
tre  at  Wagram.  The  eleven  thousand  men  (some 


12          TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  TIIEEE  AEMS. 

accounts  say  fifteen  thousand)  composing  that 
famous  column,  advanced  under  tfie  fire  of  one 
hundred  and  eighty  hostile  guns.  After  being 
driven  back  twice,  they  succeeded,  in  a  third 
attack,  in  breaking  the  enemy' s  centre.  But  of 
the  entire  column,  only  eleven  hundred  men,  it 
is  said,  were  left  standing. 

8.  The  recent  improvements  in  fire-arms  must 
-    render  the  fire  on  a  close  column  of  infantry, 

^  both  by  artillery  and  sharpshooters,  still  more 
destructive  than  it  was  before.  But  this  sacri 
fice  of  life  can  be  prevented,  to  a  great  ex- 
V  tent,  by  using  the  columns  at  a  proper  time  and 
I  in  a  proper  manner.  They  should,  like  storm- 
:  ing  parties  (which  they  really  are),  never  be 
launched  against  the  enemy's  line  till  the  fire 
by  which  they  would  suffer  has  been  quite  or 
nearly  silenced  by  our  batteries.  Sometimes 
this  may  be  impracticable  ;  but  this  precaution 
has  often  been  neglected  when  it  was  perfect 
ly  feasible,  thus  causing  a  great  and  useless 
slaughter. 

9.  But  destructive  as  may  be  artillery  fire  on 
close  columns,  on  troops  advancing  in  line  grape 
and  canister  begin  to  be  equally  so  on  their  ar 
riving  within  four  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's 
batteries  ;  and  are  certainly  quite  as  destructive, 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   INFANTRY.  13 

and  more  so,  at  the  distance  of  two  hundred 
yards.  So  that,  within  this  distance,  at  least, 
the  superiority  of  lines  over  columns  ceases  ; 
arid,  probably,  much  sooner. 

10.  The  desideratum  is  to  preserve  the  ad 
vantages  of  the  column,  while  saving  the  at 
tacking  troops  from  the  almost  total  destruc 
tion  which  would  now  seem  to  threaten  them, 
when  marching  in  such  a  formation,   from  the 
new  rifled  artillery,  which  is  said  to  fire  with 
accuracy    at   two   thousand    yards,    and    from 
the  new  infantry  rifles,  said  to  be  reliable,  in 
the    hands  of  sharpshooters,    at  five  hundred 
yards. 

11.  Perhaps  this  object  might  be  attained  by 
the  advance  of  the  attacking  troops  in  line,  but 
in  loose  order,  and  at  double  quick,  to  about 
two  hundred  paces  from  the  enemy,  a  halt,   a 
prompt  alignment  on  the  colors,  a  rapid  ploy- 
ment  into  close  column  doubled  on  the  centre, 
followed  by  a  swift  and  resolute  charge  with  the 
bayonet. 

This  method,  while  giving  the  rapid  clearing 
of  the  intervening  ground,  to  within  two  hun 
dred  paces  of  the  enemy,  and  afterwards  the 
impetus,  and  other  advantages  of  the  column, 
would,  at  the  same  time,  afford  that  compara- 


14          TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THEEE  ARMS. 

live  immunity  from  a  destructive  fire  which  is 
the  chief  advantage  of  an  advance  in  line. 

To  guard  against  the  danger,  in  the  use  of 
this  method,  of  the  troops  stopping  to  fire,  in 
stead  of  ploying  into  ;a  column  of  attack,  they 
should  commence  their  advance  with  pieces  un 
loaded.  Their  "boxes  might  even  Ibe  previously 
emptied  of  their  ammunition.  Why  should  not 
a  battle,  as  well  as  an  assault  on  a  fortress,  have 
its  "forlorn  hope?" 

12.  This  mode  of  attack  would  "be  open,  it  is 
true,  to  two  objections  : — 

First.  It  would  require  for  its  successful  exe 
cution  under  fire  great  coolness,  and  much  pre 
vious  instruction  in  the  manoeuvre,  to  enable 
the  troops  to  perform  it  promptly  and  accu 
rately. 

Secondly.  In  presence  of  a  bold  and  active 
enemy,  it  would  expose  the  attacking  troops  to 
the  danger  of  being  charged  and  routed  while 
manoeuvring. 

13.  In  the  late  War  of  the   Rebellion,   in 
lieu  of  close  columns,  attacks  have  been  some 
times  made  in  several  lines,  following  each  other 
at  distances  of  three  hundred  paces  or  more. 
Although  these  attacks    have   sometimes  suc 
ceeded,  they  are  objectionable  in  principle  ;  for 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   INFANTRY.  15 

each  line  is  in  danger  of  "being  repulsed  succes 
sively,  before  the  arrival  of  the  one  in  its  rear  ; 
and  there  is  wanting  that  great  superiority  of 
force  at  the  decisive  point  which  is  the  most  im 
portant  element  of  success  in  a  "battle. 

Such  formations  are  essentially  defensive  in 
their  nature,  and  not  suitable  for  attack.  A  line 
in  position,  against  which  the  enemy  is  advan 
cing,  is  strong  in  its  fire,  which  will  usually  pre 
serve  it  from  absolute  defeat  till  a  second  line, 
posted  at  one  hundred  and  fifty,  or  even  three 
hundred  paces  in  its  rear,  has  had  time  to  come 
up  in  support.  But  even  these  distances  Napo 
leon'  s  experience  appears  to  have  taught  him  to 
be  much  too  great ;  for  in  his  last  battle,  at  Wa 
terloo,  he  posted  his  second  line,  both  infantry 
and  cavalry,  at  only  sixty  paces  behind  the 
first ;  thus  sacrificing,  to  a  great  extent,  the 
advantage  of  keeping  the  second  line  out  of  fire, 
in  order  to  secure  the  more  important  one  of  con 
centration  of  force.  But  this  was  only  his  for 
mation  for  defence  ;  for,  in  the  same  battle,  his 
formations  for  attack  were  always  in  close  col 
umns. 

14.  Our  present  Infantry  Tactics  have  adopt 
ed  two  new  expedients  to  accelerate  the  advance 
of  battalions,  and  diminish  the  loss  to  which 


16    TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

columns  of  attack  are  liable — Division  Columns 
and  Advancing  "by  the  Flank  of  Subdivi 
sions. 

As  Division  Columns  break  the  battalion  line 
into  several  columns,  each  of  two  or  three  sub 
divisions  deep,  as  a  substitute  for  a  single  col 
umn  four  or  five  subdivisons  deep,  they  un 
doubtedly  diminish  the  loss  from  the  enemy's 
artillery  fire  in  corresponding  proportion.  But 
in  compensation  for  this  partial  advantage,  they 
have  three  defects  :— 

(1.)  In  moving  rapidly  for  any  distance, 
especially  over  broken  or  obstructed  ground, 
both  the  alignment  and  the  proper  intervals 
between  the  columns  will  usually  be  lost ;  thus 
causing,  in  the  deployment,  a  dangerous  loss  of 
time  in  re-establishing  the  alignment  and  the 
correct  intervals. 

(2. )  In  advancing  in  line  of  division  columns, 
there  is  no  means  of  forming  square,  except  by 
passing  through  an  intermediate  formation. 

(3.)  The  intervals  between  the  columns  are  so 
many  gaps,  through  which  cavalry  could  easily 
penetrate,  and  take  the  columns  in  rear. 

The  line  of  division  columns  appears  to  have 
been  first  suggested  by  Marshal  Marmont,  who 
was  a  good  artillery  commander,  but  not  neces- 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   INFANTRY.  17 

sarily,  for  that  reason,  a  weighty  authority  on  a 
point  of  Infantry  Tactics. 

15.  The  manoeuvre  of  Advancing  by  the 
Flank  of  Subdivisions  is  obnoxious  to  all  the 
objections  just  pointed  out  in  regard  to  Division 
Columns.  On  being  threatened  by  cavalry, 
though  the  troops  would  have  no  intermediate 
formation  to  pass  through  to  prepare  for  form 
ing  square,  they  would  have  to  face  into  column 
and  close  to  half  distance,  which  there  would 
often  not  be  time  to  do. 

In  addition  to  this,  the  flank  march  being 
habitually  by  fours,  the  subdivisions  would 
offer  a  tolerable  mark  for  the  enemy' s  artillery, 
and  thus  be  exposed  to  a  destructive  enfilade. 

And  in  forming  into  line,  where  the  leading 
guides  have  not  accurately  preserved  both  their 
alignment  and  their  intervals,  which  must  be 
the  usual  case  in  the  field,  there  must  be  more 
or  less  delay  and  confusion,  of  which  a  prompt 
and  active  enemy  would  not  fail  to  take  fatal 
advantage. 

The  mode  prescribed  by  the  Tactics  (Par. 
150,  School  of  the  Battalion),  for  executing  the 
manoeuvre  of  forming  line  while  advancing  by 
subdivision  flanks,  seems  also  to  call  for  re 
mark  ;  it  being  "bjr  company  (or  division)  into 


18    TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THREE  AEMS. 

line."  In  other  words,  each  individual  soldier 
brings  a  shoulder  forward,  breaks  off  from  his 
comrades,  and  hurries  up,  not  on  a  line  with 
them,  but  detached  from  them,  and  moving  in 
dependently,  to  find  his  proper  place.  This 
destroys  for  the  time  being,  and  at  a  critical 
moment,  the  unity  of  the  subdivisions,  and  so 
impairs  the  confidence  soldiers  derive  from 
realizing  that  they  form  part  of  a  compact  mass. 
In  thus  executing  this  manoeuvre  under  fire, 
and  near  the  enemy,  there  is  danger  of  the  men 
becoming  confused  and  bewildered.  For  this 
reason,  a  better  method  of  forming  line  would 
seem  to  be  to  re-form  the  column  by  a  simple 
facing,  and  then  to  wheel  into  line  by  subdi 
visions. 

16.  The  worst  possible  order  of  marching  in 
battle,  for  any  considerable  number  of  men,  as 
a  battalion,  for  instance,  is  by  the  flank.  Such 
a  line,  advancing  in  what  is  really  a  column  of 
fours,  would  be  rolled  up  and  crushed,  on  the 
enemy' s  attacking  its  head ;  and  would,  mean 
while,  be  exposed  to  enfilade.  Marching  to  a 
flank,  it  would  be  running  the  gauntlet  of  the 
enemy's  batteries  and  musketry  fire.  In  form 
ing  into  line  in  either  case,  much  time  would  be 
lost  ;  as  in  flank  marching  in  the  field,  espe- 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  IJSTFANTEY.  19 

cially  when  the  ground  is  rugged  or  obstructed, 
distances  cannot  be  preserved. 

It  may  be  here  remarked,  that  marching  to  a 
flank  in  column  also,  whether  by  division,  com 
pany,  or  platoon,  is  highly  objectionable,  as  it 
constantly  exposes  the  column  to  an  enfilading 
fire,  as  well  as  to  be  suddenly  charged  in  flank 
by  cavalry. 

V 

HI.— The  Attack,  how  made. 

1.  The  speed  of  a  column  of  attack  must 
never  be  checked  for  a  moment,  to  enable  it  to 
reply  to  the  enemy's  fire.  The  fire  of  the  col 
umn  will  be  ineffective,  for  it  will  be  the  fire  of 
excited  men,  and  very  limited  in  extent,  as  it 
can  proceed  from  the  leading  division  only; 
and  the  fire  once  begun,  it  will  be  hard  to  stop 
it.  If,  in  order  to  fire,  we  halt  the  column,  re 
forming  it  under  the  excitement  of  the  fire  will 
be  very  difficult ;  and  the  enemy's  least  forward 
movement  may  then  cause  a  rout. 

At  Maida,  in  Calabria,  in  1806,  the  French 
columns  attacked  the  English  under  General 
Stuart,  When  within  thirty  paces,  the  English 
gave  them  a  volley.  The  French,  stunned,  as 
it  were,  began,  at  once,  to  deploy.  The  English 
fired  again,  and  the  French  retreated. 


20         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

At  Waterloo,  in  the  last  grand  attack  "by  the 
French,  the  advance  column  of  the  Imperial 
Guard  was  decisively  repulsed  by  the  British 
Guards.  These  had  been  lying  on  the  ground 
behind  the  crest  of  the  slope  until  the  French 
appeared,  when  they  suddenly  rose  up  and 
poured  in  a  murderous  volley  at  short  range. 
Instead  of  instantly  charging  with  the  bayonet, 
the  French  hesitated,  then  began  to  deploy. 
The  British  charged  at  once,  and  drove  them 
down  the  hill.  • 

2.  This  dangerous  halt  and  deployment  is 
apt  also  to  occur  when  the  column  finds  shelter 
ing  objects  by  the  way.     Therefore,  hurry  by 
these,  and  hasten  the  step. 

3.  It  will  also  tend  to  prevent  such  an  un 
toward  accident,  if  we  furnish  the  columns  of 
attack,  where  several  are  employed,  with  skir 
mishers  in  their  intervals,  as  well  as  on  their 
outer  flanks,  to  draw  the  enemy's  fire.     Other 
wise,  the  column  fired  into  will  be  apt,  in  order 
to  return  the  fire,  to  halt  instinctively  and  de 
ploy  into  line,  which  breaks  up  the  attack. 

4.  From  this  it  appears  that  the  limited  fire 
of  a  column  of  attack  is,  in  fact,  no  defect,  the 
highest  offensive  power  of  infantry  being  in  the 
bayonet.     Fire,  in  the  attack,  is  generally  in- 


TACTICAL   USE   OF  INFANTRY.  21 

effective,  and  sometimes  injurious.  It  should 
rarely  Ibe  used  till  the  enemy  has  turned  his 
back. 

5.  As  to  attacking  cavalry  : 

Infantry  may  advance  in  line  and  attack  cav 
alry  safely,  provided  its  flanks  are  protected. 
Before  a  long  line  of  infantry,  cavalry  must  re 
treat,  or  be  destroyed  by  its  fire.  In  the  Aus 
trian  service  it  is'said  to  be  a  received  maxim, 
that  horses  will  not  stand  before  the  steady  ap 
proach  of  a  mass  of  infantry,  with  bayonets  at 
the  charge,  but  will  always  retire  before  the  in 
fantry  closes  on  them. 

6.  So,  infantry  in  column,  either  closed  in 
mass,  or  at  half  distance,  may  attack  cavalry 
successfully ;   taking  care  to  be  ready  to  form 
square,  or  "column  against  cavalry,"  at  the  first 
symptom  of  their  preparing  to  charge. 

7.  As  to  attacking  artillery  : 

Before  charging,  the  infantry  sometimes  first 
seeks  the  shelter  of  ground,  using  its  sharp 
shooters  to  annoy  it,  and,  if  possible,  to  silence 
its  fire. 

Or,  when  circumstances  are  favorable,  as 
when  it  can  get  a  position  near  its  flank,  it  at 
tacks  it  vigorously,  at  once,  with  fire  and  bayo 
net. 


TACTICAL   USE   O7   TTIE  THREE  AEMS. 

But  when  infantry  lias  to  advance  to  the 
attack  of  a  battery  in  front,  it  should  never  be 
in  any  compact  formation,  but  always  deployed 
as  skirmishers.  Otherwise,  it  would  usually 
meet  with  a  bloody  repulse  ;  especially  where 
any  considerable  space  of  ground  is  to  be 
cleared. 

At  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill,  the  rebel  Gen 
eral  Magruder'  s  division  was  sent,  either  in  col 
umn  or  in  line,  to  charge  a  powerful  Union  bat 
tery  just  beyond  an  open  field  a  mile  and  three- 
quarters  in  length.  The  rebels  rushed  into  the 
field  at  a  full  run,  but  encountered  a  murderous 
fire  from  the  guns  they  were  sent  to  attack, 
which  mowed  them  down  by  hundreds.  By 
the  time  they  had  cleared  two-thirds  of  the 
ground,  the  carnage  was  so  dreadful  as  to  drive 
them  back  to  the  woods  from  which  they  had 
started.  Twice  more  they  were  sent  forward  in 
the  same  manner,  but  with  the  same  result ; 
when  the  undertaking  was  abandoned. 

8.  In  attacking  a  battery,  we  may  often  se 
cure  its  capture  by  a  volley  aimed  at  the  horses  ; 
the  effect  of  which  may  prevent  the  enemy  from 
carrying  it  oif.  But  this  should  be  avoided 
when  there  is  a  good  prospect  of  capturing  the 
battery  without  disabling  the  horses ;  since 


TACTICAL   USK   OF   INFANTRY.  23 

then,  if  we  succeed,  we  shall  be  able  to  immedi 
ately  use  the  battery  against  the  enemy  our 
selves. 

9.  In  the  French  Revolution,  the  Chouans 
of  La  Yendee  attacked  the  Republican  batteries 
in  several  single  files,  of  one  or  two  hundred 
men  each,  at  intervals  of  fifty  paces.      Such  a 
formation  protects  the  attacking  columns,  to  a 
great  extent,  from  the  enemy's  fire,  but  exposes 
them  to  destruction  by  a  charge  from  the  bat 
tery  supports.    In  the  absence  of  these,  it  would 
often  be  very  advantageous ;  since,  by  proper 
drilling,  these  columns  in  one  rank  could  be 
made,  on  arriving  near  the  enemy,  to  rapidly 
double  in  two  or  four  ranks,  without  halting, 
and  then,  by  filing  to  a  flank  and  facing,  to  ad 
vance  by  the  front  in  a  compact  line. 

The  same  formation  would  be  useful  for 
troops  advancing  to  assault  an  intrenchment ; 
but,  as  in  the  case  of  a  battery,  subject  to  the 
risk  of  being  destroyed  by  a  sudden  sortie  from 
the  work. 

10.  Artillery  is  never  without  supports.   One 
part  of   the    infantry,    therefore,    deployed    as 
skirmishers,    should  attack  the  guns,    circling 
round  them,  and  opening  fire  on  the  men  and 
horses ;  while  the  other  part  attacks  the  sup- 


24         TACTICAL  USE   OF  THE  THREE  AEMS. 

port  in  flank.  On  getting  sufficiently  near,  the 
assailants  should  try  to  draw  the  fire  of  the 
guns,  and  then  rush  on  them  before  they  have 
time  to  reload. 

If  a  battery  gets  into  confusion,  or  there  is 
any  delay  in  unlimbering  or  limbering  up,  then 
is  the  most  favorable  time  to  capture  it  by  a 
vigorous  charge  with  the  bayonet. 

IV. — Ray o net  Charges. 

1.  When  made  resolutely,  and  without  slack 
ening  the  gait,  bayonet  charges  have  succeeded 
in  nine  cases  out  of  ten. 

2.  The  bayonet  is  usually  more  effective  than 
grape,  canister,  or  bullets. 

At  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  in  1813,  Kleist's 
Prussian  division  was  sent  to  carry  the  position 
of  Probstheyda.  For  this  purpose  it  was  neces 
sary  to  advance  up  a  long  slope,  the  crest  of 
which  was  occupied  by  Drouot'  s  artillery.  The 
French  allowed  the  Prussians  to  approach  to 
within  a  short  distance,  and  then  poured  into 
them  a  most  destructive  shower  of  grape,  which 
drove  them  back  for  a  moment  in  confusion. 
But  they  immediately  rallied,  and  rushed  des 
perately  on  again.  Marshal  Victor  then  charged 


TACTICAL  USE   OF  INFANTRY.  25 

them  with  the  bayonet,  and  completely  repulsed 
them. 

Afterwards,  haying  been  re-enforced  by  Witt 
genstein' s  Russian  division,  they  again  ad 
vanced,  under  a  constant  shower  of  grape  from 
Drouot.  They,  nevertheless,  kept  advancing ; 
and,  in  spite  of  the  great  loss  they  suffered, 
were  about  carrying  the  position,  when  the 
French  again  charged  with  the  bayonet,  forcing 
them  down  to  the  very  foot  of  the  declivity  ; 
where,  being  once  more  covered  with  grape, 
their  repulse  was  complete  and  final. 

So,  at  the  battle  of  Mill  Springs,  in  January, 
1862,  after  the  combatants  had  been  exchanging 
musketry  fires  for  several  hours  without  any 
decisive  result,  the  rebels'  left  was  vigorously 
charged  by  the  Ninth  Ohio  with  the  bayonet. 
This  charge  broke  the  enemy's  flank.  His 
whole  line  gave  way  in  confusion,  and  the  bat 
tle  was  won. 

So,  at  Malvern  Hill,  in  1862,  in  several  in 
stances,  columns  of  rebels  whom  a  storm  of  can 
ister  and  .shell  had  failed  to- repulse,  were  driven 
back  and  routed  by  a  dash  with  the  bayonet, 
after  a  volley  poured  in  at  a  few  yards  from  the 
muzzles  of  the  guns. 

So,  at  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines,  according 


TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

to  'leneral  Heintzelman' s  report,  whenever  our 
tr  ps  used  the  bayonet,  their  loss  was  com 
paratively  light,  and  the  enemy  was  driven 
back,  suffering  heavily. 

3.  The  bayonet  charge,  when  made  from  any 
considerable  distance,   should  be  in  column; 

^;      the  only  formation  in  which  order  can  be  com 
bined  with  sufficient  speed.      But,  at  a  short 
distance,  a  bayonet  charge  by  a  line,  instantly 
"  \     after  firing  a  volley  to  repel  an  attack,  will  be 
very  effective,  and  usually  successful. 

4.  In  ordinary  cases,  the  charge  should  be 
prepared  by  first  shattering  the  hostile  masses, 
or,  at  least,  wearying  and  demoralizing  them  by 
artillery,  or  by  skirmishers'  fire. 

5.  The  more  vigorous  and  resolute  the  charge, 
the  greater  the  chance  of  success.     The  enemy 
never  retires  before  a  moderate  advance. 

6.  Where  the  enemy  is  forced  into  a  defile, 
a  charge  with  the  bayonet,  preceded  by  a  few 
rounds  of  grape,  will  complete  his  destruction. 

7.  When  the  enemy  is  behind  cover,  the  best 
way  to  drive  him  from  it  is  with  the  bayonet. 
This  will  cause  less  loss  of  life  than  to  attempt 
to  return  his  fire.    But,  in  such  case,  the  charge 
should  be  prepared,  when  possible,  by  a  few 
shells,  or  rounds  of  canister. 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  INFANTRY.  27 

8.  Shots  up  or  down  a  declivity  usually  miss. 
A  height  should,  therefore,  be  carried  with  the 
bayonet,  without  firing. 

The  moral  effect,  moreover,  of  a  steady  charge 
of  infantry  up  a  hill,  without  stopping  to  fire,  is 
very  great ;  and  such  a  charge  is  usually  suc 
cessful.  Prince  Czartoryski,  Alexander's  most 
experienced  general  at  Austerlitz,  admitted  that 
he  lost  all  confidence  in  the  result  on  seeing  the 
French  infantry  ascending  the  plateau  of  Prat- 
zen,  the  key  to  the  Allies'  position,  with  a  firm 
and  decided  step,  without  once  stopping  to  fire. 

So,  at  Chattanooga,  in  November,  1863, 
Thomas's  troops  carried  the  height  of  Missionary 
Eidge  by  a  similar  steady  and  determined  as 
cent,  in  spite  of  the  volleys  of  grape  and  canister 
from  nearly  thirty  pieces  of  artillery,  and  of  mus 
ketry  from  the  rebels'  rifle-pits  at  the  summit, 
General  Grant  attributed  the  small  number  of 
casualties  our  troops  sustained  in  the  attack  to 
the  rebels'  surprise  at  its  audacity,  causing  "con 
fusion  and  purposeless  aiming  of  their  pieces." 

V.— Defence  against  Infantry. 

1.  The  defence  of.  infantry  is  by  its  fire,  and  ] 
therefore  its  proper  defensive  formation  is  in  S 
deployed  lines. 


28         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THEEE  ARMS. 

2.  Avoid  a  premature  commencement  of  the 
fire.     Long  firing  exhausts  the  men's  energy, 
expends  the  ammunition,  fouls  the  pieces,  de 
stroys  the  soldier's  confidence  in  his  weapon, 
and  emboldens  the  enemy. 

3.  So,  a  fire  upon  an  enemy  while  under 
cover,  as  in  a  wood,  would  "be  virtually  thrown 
away.     If  his  fire  from  such  a  position  causes 
us  any  loss,  he  had  better  be  shelled,  or  driven 
away    by    skirmishers,    according    to    circum 
stances. 

4.  The  practice  of  hostile  regiments  exchan 
ging  for  a  considerable  time  a  musketry  fire  at 
a  distance,  is  highly  objectionable,  as  it  causes 
a  great  sacrifice  of  life  without  corresponding 
results.     Instead  of  standing  in  line  for  ten  min 
utes,  receiving  and  returning  fire  at  a  distance 
of  three  hundred  yards,  it  would  be  much  bet 
ter  to  clear  this  space  at  double  quick  in  two  or 
three  minutes,  and' close  with  the  enemy  ;  for, 
in  returning  his  fire,  we  can  do  him  no  more 
harm  than  we  receive,  while  nothing  decisive 
is  accomplished.     The  case  is,  of  course,  differ 
ent  where  our  own  troops  are  behind  cover, 
while  the  enemy' s  are  exposed. 

5.  But  in  special  cases,  as  where  we  have  to 
cover  a  flank  movement  of  our  second  line,  or 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   INFANTRY.  29 

of  the  reserve,  or  to  await  a  force  coming  to  our 
support,  it  may  be  necessary  to  keep  up  an  in 
cessant  fusillade,  without  regard  to  losses  re 
ceived. 

6.  Fire  in  action  is  of  two  kinds :  the  fire  at 
will,  and  the  fire  Iby  volleys ;  the  former  kind 
being  the  rule,  the  latter  the  exception.  Al 
though  the  fire  at  will  is  the  one  principally 
used,  there  are  very  strong  objections  to  it. 

(1.)  The  men  load  and  fire  as  individuals, 
and  generally  with  great  rapidity,  and  under 
more  or  less  excitement,  rarely  stopping  to  take 
a  deliberate  aim.  The  consequence  is,  that  very 
few  shots  take  effect,  and  the  fire  is,  for  the 
greater  part,  wasted,  as  is  shown  by  the  well- 
established  fact  that,  in  every  engagement,  for 
every  man  killed  or  disabled,  there  have  been 
from  three  to  ten  thousand  musket  or  rifle  bul 
lets  fired. 

(2.)  Except  on  windy  days,  a  cloud  of  smoke 
soon  collects  in  front  of  a  line  firing  at  will, 
hiding,  more  or  less  completely,  the  enemy  from 
view.  The  fire  being  then  at  random,  it  is,  of 
course,  unreliable. 

(3.)  The  fire  at  will  leads  to  a  rapid  and 
enormous  consumption  of  ammunition.  To  show 
how  serious  is  this  objection  also,  it  is  only 


30         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE   AKMS. 

necessary  to  consider  in  how  many  instances 
victory  has  been  turned  into  defeat  by  the  pre 
mature  exhaustion,  by  one  or  more  regiments, 
of  their  ammunition. 

(4.)  As  a  necessary  consequence  of  this  rapid 
consumption  of  ammunition,  the  pieces  soon 
become  fouled,  and  thus,  to  a  great  extent, 
useless. 

(5.)  Troops  under  a  musketry  fire  at  will, 
soon  become  accustomed  to  it,  and  its  incessant 
din  produces  on  them  a  stunning  eifect,  which 
deadens,  in  no  small  degree,  their  sensibility  to 
danger. 

7.  On  the  other  hand,  volley  firing  has  often 
been  attended  with  decisive  results,  especially 
when  it  has  been  reserved  to  the  proper  mo 
ment,  and  delivered  at  short  range.  Instances 
of  this  have  occurred  in  almost  every  great  bat 
tle  we  read  of  in  history,  as  also  in  the  late  War 
of  the  Rebellion.  For  example :  at  the  battle  of 
South  Mountain,  Doubleday's  brigade  was  en 
gaged  with  a  heavy  force  of  rebels  at  some 
thirty  or  forty  paces  in  its  front.  Our  men  were 
behind  a  fence,  firing  at  will ;  but  their  fire 
made  little  or  no  impression  on  the  enemy,  who 
attempted  to  charge  at  the  least  cessation  of  the 
fire.  Our  troops  were  then  made  to  cease  firing, 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   INFANTRY.  31 

to  lie  down  behind  the  fence,  and,  on  the  ene 
my'  s  approach  to  within  fifteen  paces,  to  spring 
up  and  pour  in  a  volley.  This  was  so  deadly, 
that  the  rebels  fled  in  disorder,  leaving  their 
dead  and  wounded,  and  could  not  be  rallied 
again. 

At  Chickamauga,  in  1863,  the  regiments  of 
Hazen'  s  brigade  fired  only  by  volleys ;  every 
one  of  which,  it  is  officially  reported,  was  pow 
erfully  effective  in  checking  the  enemy's  at 
tacks. 

8.  Nevertheless,  it  has  been  a  common  mili 
tary  saying,  and  supported  even  by  high  au 
thority,  that  the  fire  at  will  is  the  only  one  pos 
sible  in  action.  This  assertion  implies  that  the 
rank  and  file  are  not  sufficiently  cool  to  reserve 
their  fire,  and  that  they  must  be  kept  constantly 
occupied  by  the  excitement,  noise,  and  smoke 
of  their  own  fire,  in  order  to  make  them  remain 
steady  in  their  ranks  under  that  of  the  enemy. 

As  applied  to  raw,  undisciplined,  or  demor 
alized  troops,  the  proposition  may  be,  to  a  great 
extent,  true.  But  in  reference  to  disciplined  or 
veteran  troops,  whose  morale  has  not  been  im 
paired,  it  will  be  found  disproved  on  almost 
every  page  of  military  history ;  from  which  a 
few  examples  will  be  cited  hereafter.  For  the 


32         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE   THREE  ARMS. 

present,  one  instance  will  suffice ;  that  of  Colo 
nel  Willich'  s  regiment  of  Thirty-second  Indiana 
Volunteers,  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  in  April, 
1862.  While  under  lire,  their  commander,  per 
ceiving  their  own  fire  to  have  become  "a  little 
wild,"  caused  them  to  cease  firing,  and  then 
drilled  them  in  the  manual  of  arms,  which  they 
went  through  as  if  on  parade  ;  after  which,  they 
again  opened  on  the  enemy  a  fire,  which  is  re 
ported  to  have  been  "deliberate,  steady,  and 
effective." 

It  may  be  here  observed  that,  whenever 
troops  lose  their  presence  of  mind,  there  is  no 
surer  way  of  restoring  it  than  by  the  repetition, 
by  their  officers,  in  their  usual  tone,  of  any 
words  of  command  they  have  learned  instinc 
tively  to  obey  on  the  dril] -ground. 

9.  Infantry,  when  charged  in  position,  should 
reserve  its  fire  till  it  can  be  made  with  deadly 

\     effect,  as  at  the  distance  of  fifty  paces ;  and  the 

volleys  should  be  instantly  followed  up  by  a 

\      countercharge  with  the  bayonet  on  the  charging 

\    enemy.      For,  if  our  fire  has  staggered  him,  a 
\   vigorous  charge  will  complete  his  repulse ;  and 
if  it  has  not,  our  only  chance  of  success  is  in 
suddenly  taking  the  offensive  ourselves. 

Whilst  awaiting  his  charge,  we  shall  incur 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   INFANTRY.  33 

but  little,  if  any,  loss  from  the  enemy' s  fire  ;  for 
the  fire  of  troops  advancing  to  attack  is  usually 
of  very  little  account. 

The  only  disadvantage  attending  a  volley 
just  before  we  charge  is,  that,  as  the  smoke 
veils  us  from  the  enemy's  view,  it  will  rob  us, 
to  some  extent,  of  the  moral  effect  of  our  swift 
advance. 

But,   in  many  cases,   if  the  enemy  see  us  / 
awaiting  his  bayonet  attack,  and  reserving  our 
fire  to  the  very  last,  he  loses  resolution,  relaxes  ! 
his  speed,  and  then  stops  short,  or  retires. 

At  Cowpens,  Colonel  Howard  broke  and 
routed  the  British  line  which  was  advancing  to 
attack  him,  by  reserving  his  fire  to  within  thirty 
yards,  and  then  charging  with  the  bayonet. 

At  the  battle  of  Friedland,  the  Russian  Im 
perial  Gfuard  charged  on  Dupont'  s  division  with 
the  bayonet.  The  French  did  not  wait  for  them 
to  close,  but  rushed  on  with  the  bayonet  them 
selves,  and  completely  routed  them. 

10.  A  volley  concentrated  upon  the  enemy's 
regimental  colors  will  usually  disable  the  color- 
guard  and  the  men  near  it ;  and,  if  promptly 
followed  up  by  a  charge,  may  enable  us  to  cap 
ture  the  colors.  This  is  always  an  important 
advantage  ;  for,  by  the  loss  of  its  colors,  a  regi- 
2* 


34    TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

ment  is  not  only  dispirited,  but  in  danger  of  dis 
organization  ;  these  being  its  proper  rallying- 
point. 

11.  When  infantry  is  acting  as  a  support  to 
artillery  which  is  attacked,  it  should  throw  out 
sharpshooters  to  reply  to  the  enemy' s  skirmish 
ers  that  are  firing  at  the  gunners  and  horses, 
whilst  it  engages  the  compact  mass  by  which 
it  is  itself  attacked. 

If  the  enemy  should  commit  the  blunder  of 
attacking  the  battery  with  his  entire  force,  with 
out  detaching  to  engage  the  support,  we  should 
profit  by  it  by  instantly  charging  him  in  flank ; 
but  taking  care  not  to  be  led  away  to  any  dis 
tance  from  the  battery  we  are  protecting. 

12.  Infantry,  surrounded  by  the  enemy,  will 
often  be  able  to  cut  its  way  through  and  escape. 
For  this  purpose,  as  the  highest  degree  of  con 
centration  is  required,  its  formation  should  be  in 
close  column. 

VI.— Defence  against  Arlillevy. 

1.  The  best  defence  of  infantry  against  artil 
lery  is  by  the  fire  of  sharp sliooters  deployed  as 
skirmishers,  to  pick  off  the  gunners  and  the 
horses;  the  main  body,  meanwhile,  occupying 
the  most  sheltered  locality  it  can  find. 


TACTICAL   USE   OF  INFANTRY.  35 

2.  Where  no  shelter  is  afforded  by  any  natu-     ) 
ral  obstacles,  or  by  irregularities  of  ground,  it 
may  be  sometimes  necessary  to  make  the  men    / 
lie  down. 

But  this  expedient  should  be  used  as  rarely 
as  possible,  on  account  of  its  demoralizing  ten 
dency.  Troops  that  have  become  accustomed 
to  it  cannot  be  expected  to  bravely  face  the 
enemy ;  and  the  habit  is  very  rapidly  formed. 
At  Bull  Run,  in  July,  1861,  a  whole  company 
was  seen  to  grovel  in  the  dust  at  the  mere  snap 
ping  of  a  percussion-cap  of  one  of  their  own 
muskets. 

This  demoralizing  tendency  does  not  exist, 
however,  where  troops  lie  down  only  to  enable  \ 
their  own  artillery  to  lire  over  them.  This  was 
shown  at  the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge,  where  several 
of  our  regiments  lay  on  the  ground  for  two 
hours  or  more,  while  thirty  of  our  guns  were 
firing  over  them.  When,  at  last,  this  fire  had 
silenced  the  enemy's  guns,  our  infantry  then 
rose,  charged  him  in  a  compact  line,  and  drove 
him  from  the  field. 

3.  A  line  of  infantry  may  avoid  cannon-shot 
by  advancing  or  retiring  fifty  paces.  A  column 
or  a  square  would  have  to  move  this  distance, 
or  more,  according  to  its  depth. 


36         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THKEE  AKMS. 

Ricochet  shots  may  be  avoided  "by  moving 
fifty  paces  to  the  right  or  left. 

This  shifting  of  position  is  but  a  temporary 
expedient,  it  is  true,  for  the  enemy' s  guns  will 
soon  obtain  the  exact  range  again.  But  for  this, 
several  trial-shots  will  be  requisite,  thus  making 
the  enemy  lose  time  ;  and,  in  battle,  a  few  min 
utes  lost  or  gained  have  often  decided  between 
victory  and  defeat. 

4.  When  the  enemy  opens  an  ^artillery  fire 
on  a  square,  preparatory  to  a  cavalry  charge, 
his  fire  must  cease  when  his  cavalry  approaches 
the  square  ;  say,  on  its  arriving  within  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  yards.  To  avoid  the  artillery 
fire,  the  square  may  safely  remain  lying  down 
until  the  hostile  cavalry  has  reached  this  point. 
For,  as  they  will  require  about  half  a  minute  to 
clear  the  intervening  ground,  the  square  will 
still  have  time  enough  left  to  rise,  align  its 
ranks,  and  deliver  a  volley  before  the  cavalry 
reaches  it. 

VII.— Defence  against  Cavalry. 

1.  The  discipline  of  infantry  is  never  put  to  a 
severer  test  than  when  it  is  required  to  resist  a 
charge  of  cavalry,  properly  made.  The  moral 
effect  of  a  charge  of  a  body  of  horse  at  full 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   INFANTRY.  37 

speed,  on  the  troops  waiting  to  receive  it,  is 
like  that  caused  by  the  swift  approach  of  a 
locomotive  under  full  steam,  seeming  quite  as 
irresistible.  It  would  be  so  in  reality,  but  for 
the  counter  effect  produced  both  on  the  horses 
and  their  riders  by  the  sight  of  the  infantry 
standing  firm  and  reserving  its  fire.  I  have 
been  told  by  an  old  cuirassier  officer,  who 
served  through  the  campaigns  of  Napoleon 
with  distinguished  bravery,  that  there  was  no 
operation  that  his  regiment  so  much  dreaded 
as  a  charge  upon  well-disciplined  infantry. 

2.  This  counter  moral  effect  on  the  charging 
cavalry  is  the  greater,  the  longer  the  infantry 
reserve  their  fire ;  since,  the  less  the  distance  at 
which  it  is  delivered,  the  more  fatal  will  be  its 
effects.  A  volley  at  long  range  is  not  destruc 
tive  enough  to  check  the  cavalry' s  advance ; 
while  this  effect  has  often  been  produced  by  the 
infantry  merely  withholding  its  fire  till  the  cav 
alry  has  approached  very  near ;  and  a  volley 
delivered  at  the  very  last  moment  has,  in  by 
far  the  greater  number  of  instances,  effectually 
repulsed  the  charge. 

Infantry  should,  therefore,  let  cavalry  ap 
proach  to  within  forty  paces,  or  nearer  still,  and 
then  give  them  a  general  volley. 


38         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THEEE  AEMS. 

At  the  battle  of  Neerwinden,  in  1793,  the 
Austrian  cavalry  was  repulsed  by  the  French 
infantry  under  Dumouriez,  by  a  volley  poured 
in  at  the  very  muzzles  of  the  pieces. 

At  Austerlitz,  a  Russian  cavalry  charge  on 
French  infantry  in  line  was  repulsed  by  a  vol 
ley  delivered  so  near,  that  it  stretched  four  hun 
dred  troopers  on  the  ground.  The  rest  dis 
persed  in  disorder  to  the  right  and  left. 

3.  The  armor  of  cuirassiers  is  bullet-proof. 
To  repel  a  charge  of  these  troops,  therefore,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  aim  at  the  horses.     Their 
armor  is  so  heavy,  that  the  mere  fall  of  the 
riders  on  the  ground  is  usually  sufficient  to  dis 
able  them,  as  was  the  case  with  the  French 
cuirassiers  at  Waterloo. 

4.  Infantry  in  line,  in  two  ranks  even,  may 
withstand  cavalry,  if  in  compact  order,  and  at 
tacked  in  front.      But   the    slightest   cavalry 
charge  on  the  flank  of  a  line  will  rout  it. 

At  Quatre  Bras,  a  French  infantry  line,  ad 
vancing,  repulsed  a  charge  of  the  Brunswicker 
Lancers  under  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  by  re 
ceiving  it  in  steadiness  and  good  order,  and 
then  pouring  in  a  destructive  fire. 

But,  in  the  same  battle,  the  Sixty-ninth  Brit 
ish  Regiment  was  instantly  rolled  up  and  de- 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   INFANTRY.  39 

stroyed  by  a  charge  of  French  cuirassiers  on  its 
flank. 

5.  Where  infantry  is  well  disciplined,  and 
its  commander  is  cool  and  prompt,  it  may  some 
times  avoid  the  effect  of  a  cavalry  charge  Iby 
other  means  than  its  fire,  or  formation  in  square. 
At  Talayera,  a  French  infantry  division,  drawn 
up  in  close  column,  seeing  an  English  cavalry 
regiment  charging  down  upon  them,  avoided 
the  shock  by  simply  stepping  aside,  thus  allow 
ing  the  cavalry  to  pass  by  them.     A  portion  of 
the  charging  troops  wheeled  round  to  follow 
them  ;  but,  by  the  cross-fire  of  another  division, 
and  the  charge  of  other  cavalry,  which  fell  upon 
it  in  its  confusion,  it  was  completely  annihi 
lated. 

6.  A  line  of  infantry  charged  by  cavalry  in 
flank,  and  so  suddenly  as  to  allow  no  time  to 
form  square,  could  hardly  escape  destruction. 
It  would  seem  that  the  best  course  to  be  adopt 
ed  in  such  a  case  would  be~to  open  the  ranks 
by  a  rapid  and  simultaneous  movement  of  both 
of  them,  thus  compelling  the  charging  cavalry 
to  ride  between  them.     If  the  front  rank  should 
then  face  about,  this  would  bring  the  cavalry 
between  two  fires,  which  might  be  poured  in 
with  most  destructive  effect. 


40         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THEEE  ATCMS. 

But  where  the  cavalry  charges  with  a  very 
wide  front,  or  in  line,  this  manoeuvre  might  be 
difficult,  or  impossible. 

7.  Whenever  an  infantry  line  is  charged  by 
cavalry  in  front,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  it 
will  stand  the  shock,  the  wisest  course  would 
seem  to  be  to  make  the  men  lie  down,  and  let 
the  charging  cavalry  leap  over  them.     This  the 
horses  will  instinctively  do,  with  but  little  risk 
of  injury  to  the  men,  provided  they  lie  in  a 
position  parallel  to  the  line  of  battle,  thus  pre 
senting  the  least  possible  depth.     It  is  said  that 
the  British  infantry  has  sometimes  done  this, 
and  risen  up  again  immediately  after  the  caval 
ry  had  passed.      The   cavalry  could  thus  be 
promptly  taken  in  rear. 

8.  In  retreating,  when  threatened  by  cav 
alry,  if  there  be  a  long  plain  in  our  rear,  we 
must  retire  slowly.     But  if  cover,  or  ground 
unfavorable  to  cavalry,  be  near,  we  must  reach 
it  as  soon  as  possible. 

VIII. — Squarc§. 

1.  In  1813,  France  was  nearly  exhausted  of 
soldiers,  so  that  Napoleon,  on  hastily  preparing 
for  his  campaign  of  that  year,  was  obliged  to 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  INFANTEY.  41 

incorporate  into  his  army  a  large  number  of  raw 
conscripts,  who  had  scarcely  begun  their  ele 
mentary  drill.  On  the  route  to  their  respective 
points  of  concentration,  he  accordingly  ordered 
his  columns  to  halt  each  day,  to  practise  tlie 
three  movements  which  he  considered  to  be  the 
most  important  for  infantry  to  be  familiar  with. 
These  were,  forming  battalions  in  square,  de 
ploying  in  line,  and  re-forming  in  column  of 
attack. 

2.  In  the  Austrian  service,  squares  formed 
by  a  column  in  mass  are  considered  preferable 
to  hollow  ones,  on  the  supposition  that  though 
horses  will  recoil  from  a  dense  mass,  they  may 
be  easily  brought  to  break  through  a  shallow 
formation,  over  which  they  can  see  the  open 
ground.     But  this  theory  seems  to  be  refuted 
by  numerous  facts.     A  large  proportion  of  the 
formations  that  have  successfully  repulsed  cav 
alry,  since  the  beginning  of  this  century,  have 
been  hollow  squares. 

3.  The  rule  laid  down  in  the  Tactics  (Par. 
143,  Skirmishers),  directing  the  skirmishers,  in 
rallying  on  the   square,  to  "  come  to  a  ready 
without  command,  and  fire  upon  the  enemy ; 
which  will  also  be  done  by  the  reserve,  as  soon 
as  it  is  unmasked  by  the  skirmishers,"  is  an  un- 


42         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

sound  one,  for  a  compliance  with  it  would  be 
dangerous.  A  square  cannot  expect  to  repulse 
cavalry  by  an  irregular  fire  at  will,  but  only 
by  well-directed  volleys.  If  cavalry  charge  a 
square  firing  irregularly,  it  will  probably  rout 
it.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  square  wait  coolly 
till  the  cavalry  is  at  twenty  paces,  its  volley 
will  be  murderous.  At  Waterloo,  the  Allied 
squares  that  reserved  their  fire  till  the  French 
cavalry  had  arrived  at  from  twenty  to  forty 
paces,  invariably  repulsed  it.  At  that  battle, 
ISTey  led  eleven  cavalry  charges  against  the 
British  squares,  every  one  of  which  failed. 

At  the  opening  of  the  campaign  of  1813, 
Napoleon  had,  comparatively,  but  a  handful 
of  cavalry  ;  so  few,  that  they  had  to  keep  close 
to  their  infantry  for  protection.  In  crossing  the 
plains  of  Lutzen,  a  large  and  splendid  cavalry 
force  of  the  Allies,  supported  by  infantry  and 
by  horse- artillery,  made  an  attack  on  Ney's 
corps,  which  consisted  chiefly  of  young  and  raw 
recruits,  who  saw  an  enemy  for  the  first  time. 
The  situation  was  extremely  dangerous,  and 
Ney  and  his  principal  generals  threw  them 
selves  into  the  squares  to  encourage  them.  By 
volleys  delivered  at  a  signal,  the  enemy's 
charges  were  all  repulsed,  and  the  conscripts 


TACTICAL   USE   OF  INFANTRY.  43 

acquired  great  confidence  from  the  ease  with 
which  this  was  done.  Ney  then  broke  up  his 
squares,  and,  pursuing  the  enemy  in  columns, 
completed  their  repulse. 

At  Auerstadt,  in  1806,  Davoust's  French 
squares  had  to  sustain  a  long  succession  of 
charges  from  ten  thousand  Prussian  horse.  By 
reserving  their  fire,  each  time,  to  within  thirty 
or  forty  paces,  its  effect  was  so  deadly,  that  a 
rampart  of  dead  and  disabled  men  and  horses 
was  soon  formed  around  the  squares,  and  the 
charges  were  all  repulsed. 

So,  at  Jena,  on  the  same  day,  Ney,  posted  in 
a  square,  allowed  the  Prussian  cuirassiers  to 
charge  up  to  within  fifteen  or  twenty  paces, 
when  the  front  attacked,  at  his  word  of  com 
mand,  poured  in  a  fire  which  completely  re 
pulsed  the  charge,  strewing  the  whole  ground 
with  dead  and  wounded.  The  Prussian  cavalry, 
in  that  battle,  are  said  to  have  been  "  terrified 
at  the  sight  of  a  motionless  infantry  reserving  its 
fire." 

Again,  at  Mount  Tabor,  in  1798,  General 
Kleber,  marching  with  an  infantry  division  of 
only  three  thousand  men,  over  an  immense 
sandy  plain,  was  attacked  by  twelve  thousand 
Turkish  horse.  The  French  squares  resisted 


44         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

their  successive  charges  for  six  hours,  by  means 
of  volleys  reserved  till  the  enemy  were  at  the 
very  muzzles  of  their  guns ;  which  soon  built 
up  a  rampart  around  them  of  men  and  horses. 
Bonaparte  then  arrived  with  another  division. 
Dividing  it  into  two  squares,  he  rapidly  ad 
vanced  them  in  siich  a  manner  as  to  enclose  the 
Turks  in  a  kind  of  triangle  ;  when,  by  a  sudden 
fire  upon  them  from  three  points  at  once,  he 
drove  them  upon  each  other  in  confusion,  ma 
king  them  flee  in  every  direction. 

It  may  be  observed,  that  advancing  or  ma 
noeuvring  in  squares  is  practicable  only  on  open 
and  level  plains,*like  the  sandy  deserts  of  Egypt 
and  Syria. 

4.  The  best  reliance  of  an  infantry  square 
being,  therefore,  on  its  fire  by  volleys,  the  men 
should  be  instructed  to  come  to  a  cliarge  bayo 
net,  instead  of  a  "  ready,"  immediately  on  form 
ing  square.      From  this  latter  position,  there 
would  be  much  greater  danger  of  the  volley 
being   prematurely  delivered.      The  fire  of  a 
single  excited  man  will  usually  be  followed  by 
a  general  discharge. 

5.  It  may  be  often  advisable  that  the  volley 
should  be  delivered  by  'both  ranfcs  at  once,  and 
not  by  a  single  one.     Par.  1191,  School  of  the 


TACTICAL   USE  OF  INFANTRY.  45 

Battalion,  directing  that  "a  "battalion,  in  square, 
will  never  use  any  other  than  the  fire  by  file,  or 
by  rank,"  should  therefore  be  amended. 

6.  Moreover,  in  view  of  what  has  been  said 
as  to  volley-firing,   and  of  the  examples  that 
have  been  cited  in  confirmation,  there  is  reason 
to  doubt  the  wisdom  of  the  direction  contained 
in  Par.  67,  School  of  the  Company:  "The  fire 
by  file  being  that  which  is  most  frequently  used 
against  an  enemy,  it  is  highly  important  that  it 
be  rendered   perfectly  familiar  to  the  troops. 
The  instructor  will,  therefore,  give  it  almost  ex 
clusive  preference. ' ' 

The  fire  by  file,  after  its  commencement,  be 
comes  a  mere  individual  fire  at  will.  Indepen 
dently  of  the  general  ineffectiveness  of  this  kind 
of  fire,  one  would  have  supposed  that  the  in 
structor's  attention  should  be  rather  directed  to 
accustoming  the  men  to  the  more  difficult  re 
served  fire  by  volleys,  instead  of  practising 
them  almost  exclusively  in  a  fire  which,  once 
learned,  they  will  use  instinctively,  and  without 
any  practice  at  all. 

7.  Infantry  breech-loading  weapons  would 
be  very  useful  to  troops  in  square,  when  charged 
by  cavalry ;  since,  being  rapidly  reloaded,  they 
would  enable  the  square  to  repulse,  with  a  vol- 


46         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

ley,  each  subdivision  successively,  where  the 
charging  column  is  formed  at  the  usual  distan 
ces.  But  it  is  doubtful  whether,  on  the  whole, 
these  weapons  are  preferable  to  muzzle-loaders. 
Certain  it  is,  that  they  exhaust  the  ammunition 
much  more  rapidly,  and  so  cause  a  suspension 
of  fire,  and  a  withdrawal  from  the  line  of  battle, 
till  a  new  supply  can  arrive.  And,  to  obtain 
this  new  supply,  a  long  time  is  generally  re 
quired  ;  infantry  ammunition  being  usually  car 
ried  in  the  second,  or  more  distant  ammunition 
train,  instead  of  the  first,  or  nearest  one,  as  it 
ought  to  be. 

8.  Although  a  reserved  fire  is  much  the  most 
reliable  in  repulsing  cavalry,  the  men  may  some 
times  be  ordered  to  commence  the  fire  at  a  con 
siderable  distance.     In  such  case,  they  should 
be  instructed  to  aim  at  the  horses,  instead  of 
their  riders,  as  affording  a  better  mark. 

9.  European  cavalry  is  often  practised,  on 
arriving  within  four  hundred  yards,  or  effective 
grape-shot  distance,  of  an  infantry  square,  to 
halt,  and  then  open  at  the  centre,  unmasking  a 
battery  of  horse-artillery,  which  plays  for  a  cer 
tain  time  on  the  square,  when  the  cavalry  closes 
again,  and  charges. 

A  square,  however,  attacked  in  this  manner, 


TACTICAL   USE   OF  INFANTRY.  47 

is  not  in  so  much  danger  of  being  broken  as 
might  be  imagined.  The  enemy's  guns,  after 
being  unmasked,  would  usually  require  several 
trial  rounds  to  get  the  exact  range ;  and  our 
sharpshooters,  who  could  safely  be  thrown  for 
ward  one  hundred  yards,  with  the  new  rifled 
arms,  ought,  in  the  mean  time,  to  inflict  such 
loss  on  the  cavalry,  as  well  as  on  the  battery, 
as  to  cause  it  either  to  retire,  or  to  charge 
feebly,  and,  therefore,  ineffectively.  At  the 
very  worst,  the  square  would  have  ample  time 
to  re-form  its  ranks,  and  deliver  a  deadly  volley 
before  the  cavalry  could  reach  it,  as  it  also 
would  if  this  operation  were  attempted  much 
nearer,  say  at  two  hundred  yards.  In  this  last 
case,  a  few  volleys  from  the  square  itself,  with 
the  new  arms,  would  probably  be  destructive 
enough  to  prevent  the  charge  altogether. 

10.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  observe,  that 
troops  formed  in  square,  when  charged  by  cav 
alry,  can  secure  their  safety  only  by  standing 
firm.     A  single  opening  will  suffice  to  let  in 
the  enemy,  who  will  then  easily  ride  over  the 
square,  and  cut  it  in  pieces.     Whereas,  if  the 
square    remain   unbroken,   cavalry  can    inflict 
upon  it  no  loss,  or  but  a  trifling  one. 

11.  In  repulsing  a  cavalry  charge,  coolness 


48         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

and  presence  of  mind  will  sometimes  enable 
troops  to  accomplish  extraordinary  results. 

At  Quatre  Bras,  the  square  of  the  Forty- 
second  Highlanders  was  not  completed,  the  com 
panies  still  running  in  to  form  the  rear  face, 
when  the  enemy's  leading  troop  entered.  But 
the  square,  nevertheless,  finished  its  formation ; 
and  the  French  cavalry,  caught,  as  it  were,  in  a 
net,  was  soon  destroyed  "by  the  concentrated  fire 
of  all  the  fronts,  which  had  faced  inward. 

In  the  same  battle,  the  Forty-fourth  British 
Kegiment,  standing  in  line  in  two  ranks,  was 
suddenly  charged  in  rear  by  the  French  Lan 
cers,  who  had  dashed  round  one  of  their  flanks 
for  that  purpose.  The  rear  rank  suddenly  faced 
about,  and,  at  a  very  short  distance,  poured  in 
a  deadly  fire,  which  put  them  into  confusion. 
On  their  way  back  to  re-form,  the  front  rank,  in 
its  turn,  gave  them  a  volley,  which  destroyed 
great  numbers  of  them,  and  completed  their 
rout. 

12.  Even  when  a  square  has  been  actually 
broken,  it  is  not  necessarily  lost.  If  the  troops 
are  brave  and  well  disciplined,  it  may  some 
times  be  rallied  again,  re-formed,  and  made  to 
repulse  the  attacking  cavalry,  as  was  the  case 
with  some  of  the  Allied  squares  at  Waterloo. 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  INFANTRY.  49 

So,  at  the  battle  of  Pnltnsk,  in  1806,  a 
French  battalion  that  had  been  broken  and 
overthrown  by  Russian  cavalry,  immediately 
rallied,  fell  on  the  troopers  floundering  in  the 
mud,  and  dispatched  them. 

So,  at  the  battle  of  Krasnoe,  in  1812,  a  large 
Russian  square  was  retreating  before  the  French 
cavalry  masses.     Occasionally,  in  order  to  pass 
a  narrow  defile,  it  was  obliged,  temporarily,  to 
break  the  square.     At  these  times  the  French 
made  furious  charges,  penetrated  into  the  col 
umn,  and  captured  men  and  guns.     But  as  soon 
as  the  defile  was  passed,  the  Russians  instantly 
re-formed  the  square,   and  continued  their  re 
treat.     They  finally  succeeded  in  reaching  Ko^ 
rytnia,  after  killing  and  wounding  some  four 
hundred  or  five  hundred  of  the  French  ;  though 
with  the  loss  of  eight  guns,  one  thousand  pris 
oners,  and  seven  hundred  or  eight  hundred  Tiors 
de  combat,  out  of  five  thousand  or  six  thousand 
men. 


IX.—Skirmishers. 

We  shall  consider — 
First,  THEIR  USE. 

Secondly,  How  THEY  ARE  POSTED. 
3 


50          TACTICAL   USE  OF   THE  THREE  ARMS. 

Thirdly,  How  THEY  ARE  HANDLED. 
Fourthly,    RULES    FOE   INDIVIDUAL    SKIR 
MISHERS. 

A.  THEIR  USE. 

1.  In   approaching    the    enemy   through   a 
wooded  or  Ibroken  country,  skirmishers  thrown 
out  in  advance,  and  on  the  flanks  of  the  leading 
column,  are  absolutely  indispensable,  in  order 
to  reconnoitre  the  ground,  and  prevent  a  sur 
prise. 

2.  Skirmishers  protect  the  main  body,  or  any 
particular  portion  of  it,  from  attack  while  ma 
noeuvring. 

A  regiment,  or  a  brigade,  in  covered  ground, 
whether  the  enemy  be  visible  or  not,  should 
never  change  its  position  in  battle,  or  manoeu 
vre,  without  the  protection  of  a  skirmishing 

line. 

3.  They  furnish  a  screen,  behind  which  the 
main  body  may  hide  its  movements,  and  be  en 
abled  to  attack  at  an  unexpected  point. 

4.  Where  a  ravine,  a  wood,  or  other  similar 
obstacle  causes  a  break  in  our  line  of  battle, 
by  occupying  it  with  skirmishers  we  guard  it 
against  penetration  by  the  enemy,  and  connect 
the  separated  corps  with  each  other. 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  INFANTRY.  01 

5.  Skirmishers  may  be  used  to  alarm  the 
enemy  at  a  point  where  he  expected  no  attack, 
and  thus  create  a  diversion. 

6.  By  their  attack  at  various  points,  they 
serve  to  unmask  the  enemy's  position. 

7.  They  may  be  employed  to  open  the  way 
for  a  charge  with  the  bayonet. 

At  the  battle  of  Stone  Elver,  the  rebels,  on 

one  occasion,  advanced  in  line,  with  a  double 

column  in  rear  of  each  wing,  preceded  by  a 

double  line  of  skirmishers,  who  reserved  their 

fire  till  close  to  our  line,  when  they  halted, 

poured  in  a  murderous  fire,  and  fell  back  on 

their  main  body,  which  then  rushed  forward. 

Both  our  first  and  second  lines,  staggered  by 

this  sudden  and  destructive  fire,   were   swept 

from  the  ground. 

8.  Skirmishers  have  been  sometimes  thrown 
forward  to  fast  the  spirit  and  disposition  of  the 
enemy. 

At  Biberach,  in  1800,  the  French  general  St. 
Cyr,  after  having  carried  the  place,  and  driven 
the  Austrians  through  the  defile  in  rear  of  it 
back  upon  their  main  body,  posted  on  the 
heights  of  Wittenburg,  sent  forward  a  strong 
line  of  skirmishers  to  open  fire  on  them,  with 
the  view  of  ascertaining  their  temper  and  dispo- 


52         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  TIIEEE  AEMS. 

sition  after  tlieir  van-guard  had  been  defeated 
and  driven  in.  This  drew  forth  a  general  and 
continued  discharge,  like  that  which  demoral 
ized  troops  are  apt  to  indulge  in  to  keep  up 
their  spirits  by  their  own  noise.  Seeing  this, 
St.  Cyr  instantly  prepared  to  charge,  although 
he  had  with,  him  but  twenty  thousand  men,  and 
the  Austrians  numbered  sixty  thousand,  and 
were  in  a  strong  position.  The  result  justified 
his  decision ;  for,  on  the  near  approach  of  the 
French,  the  Austrians  fired  a  volley  or  two  and 
then  retreated  in  confusion. 

9.  Skirmishers  should  accompany  columns 
of  attack;  for— 

(1.)  They  increase  the  confidence  of  the  troops 
they  accompany.  Placed  between  the  columns, 
they  advance  boldly  because  the  columns  ad 
vance,  and  the  columns  advance  boldly  because 
the  skirmishers  do. 

(2.)  Preceding  the  columns,  by  driving  back 
the  enemy's  skirmishers,  and  diverting  his  fire 
to  themselves,  they  keep  the  attacking  columns 
as  free  from  loss  as  possible  till  the  shock. 

They,  moreover,  serve  to  annoy  the  troops 
we  are  about  to  attack,  by  the  incessant  sharp 
buzzing  of  their  deadly  bullets  among  them, 
like  so  many  bees,  killing  some  and  disabling 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   INFANTRY.  53 

others  ;  and  this,  sometimes,  to  such  a  degree  as 
to  demoralize  them. 

It  is  said  that,  at  Waterloo,  the  swarms  of 
skirmishers  that  covered  the  French  attacking 
columns  so  galled  and  excited  the  stationary 
columns  and  squares  of  some  of  the  Allies,  as 
to  nearty  drive  them  from  the  field. 

(3.)  On  the  flanks  of  a  column,  they  cover 
them  from  attack. 

(4.)  They  draw  the  enemy's  fire  prematurely, 
and  thus  render  it  comparatively  ineffective.  * 

(5.)  They  prevent  the  columns  from  halting 
to  deploy  and  fire. 

(6.)  They  may  sometimes  conceal  the  direction 
of  the  march  of  the  attacking  column,  and  even 
seize  the  guns  that  have  been  playing  on  it. 

10.  In  defence,  if  they  can  encircle  the  ene 
my ]s  advancing  column,  they  may  destroy  it  by 
their  concentric  fire. 

11.  In  a  retreat,  skirmishers  cover  the  rear, 
so  long  as  the  enemy  attacks  without  cavalry. 

12.  The    new  rifled  arms  have  obviously 
much  increased  the  effectiveness  of  skirmishers. 

B.  How  POSTED. 

1.  They  should  be  always  near  enough  to 
-the  main  body  to  be  supported  by  it,  if  hard 


54         TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  TIIEEE  AEMS. 

pressed,  and  also  to  enable  the  main  body  to 
profit  at  once  of  any  advantage  that  may  have 
"been  gained  by  them. 

2.  They  should  cover  the  main  body,  both  in 
front  and  in  flank,  except  where  the  ground 
may  render  this  impracticable  or  unnecessary  ; 
and,  in  defensive  positions,  they  should  occupy 
every  point  from  which  the  enemy's  skirmishers 
might  annoy  us. 

3.  In  a  defensive  combat,  they  should  be  so 
posted  as  to  take  the  enemy's  attack  inflaiik : 

(1.)  Because  their  fire  will  be  thus  the  more 
destructive ;  and— 

(2.)  They  will  not  be  exposed  to  be  driven 
back  by  the  enemy's  fire,  or  by  his  advance. 

4.  If  thrown  into  an  enclosure,  they  must 
have  an  easy  exit     Skirmishers  feeling  them 
selves  in  danger  of  being  cut  off,  will  lose  some 
what  of  that  coolness  which  is  so  essential  to 
their  efficiency. 

5.  They  should  not  be  kept  stationary  ~be- 
Jiind  a  straight  line,  as  a  wall,"  a  fence,  or  a 
hedge  ;  for  this  would  expose  them  to  enfilade. 

6.  Skirmishers  are  only  auxiliary  to  the  main 
force,  and  are  not  capable,  by  themselves,  of 
effecting  any  decisive  result.     Therefore,  in  or 
der  not  to  exhaust  the  men,  heavy  skirmishing 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   INFANTRY.  55 

lines  should  not  "be  used,  except  to  lead  a  de 
cided  advance,  or  to  repel  one. 

7.  The  principle  is,  to  post  skirmishers  so  as 
to  give  them  the  maximum  of  shelter,  whilst  in 
flicting  the  maximum  of  loss  on  the  enemy. 
This  applies  to  the  placing  of  the  whole  line, 
and  to  the  separate  groups.  The  way  skirmish 
ers,  produce  their  effect  is  by  sharpshooting, 
which  requires  calmness ;  and  the  more  com 
pletely  sheltered  they  are,  the  calmer  they  will 
"be,  and  the  more  deadly  will  be  their  aim. 

C.  How  HANDLED. 

1.  Deploy  them  before  coming  witJiin  range 
of  musketry  ;  for  infantry  in  compact  order  is  a 
good  target  for  the  enemy. 

2.  They  should  be  kept  well  in  hand  ;  espe 
cially  at  the  moment  of  success,  when  they  are 
in  danger  of  rushing  headlong  to  destruction. 

3.  Coming  upon  the  enemy's  main  body, 
they  should  occupy  him  in  front  and  flank  till 
our  own  main  body  gets  up. 

4.  Except  in  urgent  cases,  never  deploy  a 
line  of  skirmishers  on  a  run;  for  this  makes 
them  lose  breath  and  calmness,  and,  with  their 
calmness,  their  accuracy  of  aim. 


56          TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THKEE  ARMS. 

So,  after  deployment,  avoid  all  rapid  and 
violent  movements. 

5.  Skirmishers  become  exhausted  after  long 
firing.     The  longer  they  continue  out,  the  worse 
they  shoot.     Therefore,  relieve  them  often. 

6.  Skirmishers  should  be  accustomed  to  lie 
down  at  a  given  signal ;  as  it  is  sometimes  very 
important  that  both  our  artillery  and  infantry 
should  be  able  to  fire  over  them. 

7.  In  retreat,  skirmishers  occupy  every  fa 
vorable  point  for  holding  the  enemy  in  check. 

D.  RULES  FOE  INDIVIDUAL  SKIRMISHERS. 

1.  In  advancing,  in  retreat,  or  at  a  halt,  use 
every  cover  that  presents  itself. 

2.  Preserve  the  alignment  and  the  intervals, 
so  far  as  possible.    On  open  ground,  this  may  be 
done  perfectly.     In  woods,  skirmishers  should 
never,  for  a  moment,  lose  sight  of  each  other. 

3.  The  security  of  the  flanks  should  be  look 
ed  out  for  by  the  men  near  them. 

4.  Run  over  exposed  ground  as  quickly  as 
possible. 

5.  Approach  the  crest  of  a  hill  with  great 
caution. 

6.  If  threatened  by  artillery  alone,  advance 
and  kill  off  the  men  and  horses  before  they  get 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   INFANTKY.  57 

into  battery.  When  the  pieces  have  got  into 
battery,  lie  down,  if  on  exposed  ground,  till 
they  limber  up  again,  and  then  recommence  the 
fire.** 

7.  A  skirmisher,  with  the  new  rifled  arms, 
ought,  at  five  hundred  yards,  to  be  more  than  a 
match  for  a  gun;  for,  in  men  and  horses,  he 
has  a  much  larger  target  than  the  gun  has  in 
him. 

Again,  with  the  new  rifle  shells,  he  may  be 
able  to  blow  up  a  caisson. 

8.  Neither  should  a  skirmisher  have  much 
to  fear  from  a  single  Jwrseman.    With  his  bayo 
net  fixed,  he  would  usually  be  able  to  defend 
himself  successfully  against  the  trooper,  whose 
sabre  is  the  shorter  weapon  of  the  two ;  more 
especially,  if  he  will  take  care  to  keep  on  the 
trooper' s  left,  which  is  his  exposed  side. 

9.  Never  lose  your  calmness.     Your  power 
consists,  not  in  rapid  firing,  but  in  the  accuracy 
of  your  aim.     Avoid  all  hurried  and  violent 
movements  ;  and  never  raise  your  gun  till  sure 
of  a  shot. 

10.  The  aim,    according   to   the  Tactics,    is 
made  by  bringing  the  gun  down,   instead  of 
raising  it  up.     However  little  the  soldier  may 
be  excited,  he  will  be  apt  to  pull  the  trigger 

3* 


58    TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THEEE  ARMS. 

more  or  less  too  soon  ;  that  is,  while  the  muzzle 
is  yet  too  elevated.  This  is  the  reason  why  in 
fantry  missiles  usually  fly  too  liigli.  The  diffi 
culty  would  not  be  obviated  by  causing  the  aim 
to  be  made  by  raising  the  piece ;  for  then  the 
same  disturbing  cause  already  mentioned,  the 
soldier's  excitement,  would  make  the  shots  fly 
as  much  too  low,  as  they  now  fly  too  high. 

Rapid  firing  is  another  cause  of  this  incom 
pleteness  of  aim.  Infantry  firing  is  already  too 
rapid  to  be  effective ;  so  that  what  is  claimed 
for  the  new  breech-loading  weapons  as  an  ad 
vantage,  that  they  increase  the  rapidity  of  fire, 
furnishes,  on  the  contrary,  a  strong  objection  to 
them.  The  effectiveness  of  the  fire  of  a  sharp 
shooter,  especially,  will  be  usually  in  inverse, 
instead  of  direct  proportion  to  the  number  of 
shots  he  delivers  in  a  given  time. 

In  view  of  this,  and  of  the  tendency  to  pull 
the  trigger  before  the  muzzle  is  sufficiently  de 
pressed,  it  has  become  an  established  maxim,  to 

"  Aim  low, 
Fire  slow  " 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  ARTILLERY. 

THE  subject  will  be  treated  under  the  fol 
lowing  heads : — 

I. — HOW   POSTED    WITH    EESPECT    TO    THE 

GROUND. 

II.— HOW    POSTED    WITH    EESPECT   TO    OUE 

OWN  TROOPS. 
HI- — HOW  POSTED  WITH  EESPECT  TO  THE 

ENEMY. 
IV.— -POSTING  OF  BATTERIES  AND  PIECES 

AS   BETWEEN  THEMSELVES. 
V. — HOW  USED. 

VI.— ITS  FIEE. 
VII.— ITS  SUPPORTS. 

*•— How  posted  with  respect  to  the  Ground. 

1.  Artillery  has  a  much  longer  range  than 
musketry.  In  order  to  avail  ourselves  of  this 
advantage,  we  must  so  post  it  as  to  overlook  all 
the  ground  to  which  its  utmost  range  extends. 
It  therefore  requires  an  elevated  position. 


60          TACTICAL   USE   OF   THE   TIIKEE   AKMS. 

2.  It  has  been  considered  an  additional  ad 
vantage  of  a  commanding  position  for  artillery, 
that  it  enables  our  guns  to  coyer  our  infantry, 
attacking    or    attacked,    by  firing    over    tJieir 
heads. 

This  was  done  by  the  French  at  Waterloo, 
apparently  with  great  effect.  But  the  advan 
tage  is  a  doubtful  one  ;  for  firing  over  our 
own  troops,  especially  with  cast- shot  or  shell, 
is  very  dangerous  to  them,  and  is  apt  to  in 
timidate  them.  It  moreover  furnishes  to  the 
enemy  a  double  target.  The  shot  which  miss 
our  troops  will  be  apt  to  fall  among  the  guns 
behind  them ;  and  some  of  those  which  do  not 
reach  the  guns,  will  probably  take  effect  among 
the  troops  in  front  of  them. 

3.  But  very  liigli  points  are  unfavorable  po 
sitions  for  batteries.     Batteries  so  placed  would 
not  command  the  ground   immediately  below 
them  ;  as  guns  cannot  be  depressed  to  fire  be 
low  a  certain  angle  without    soon  destroying 
their  carriages.     And  this  would  facilitate  their 
capture ;  for,  once  arrived  on  the  ground  near 
them,  the  assailants  could  not  be  injured  by 
their  fire.     It  has  been  estimated  that  the  slope 
in  front  of  a  battery  should  not  exceed  one  per 
pendicular  to  fifteen  base. 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  AETILLEEY.        61 

4.  When  guns  haye  to  foe  used  as  a  support 
to  other  parts  of  the  line,  which  is  often  the 
case,  their  capture  might  lead  to  serious  con 
sequences.      They  should    therefore   have   the 
ground  clear  of  all  obstacles  which  may  masTc 
tlieir  fire,  not  only  in  front,  but  to  their  right 
and  left. 

5.  Although  the  most  favorable  position  for 
guns  is  an  eminence  sloping  gradually  towards 
the  enemy,  an  open  and  level  plain  is  by  no 
means  an  unfavorable  one  ;  for,  on  such  ground, 
the  enemy  will  be  visible  at  a  great  distance, 
and  our  shot  may  act  by  ricochet,  which  causes 
more    destruction    than    ordinary    point-blank 
firing. 

For  ricochet,  firm  and  even  ground  is  requi 
site  ;  on  soft  or  rough  ground  it  is  not  attain 
able. 

6.  In  enfilading  the  enemy's  position,  or  in 
raking  his  advancing  columns  from  head  to  rear, 
a  grazing  fire  is  the  most  destructive  that  can 
be  used.     This  consists  of  a  long  succession  of 
ricochets  at  low  heights.      Where  the  ground 
is  level  and  firm,  we  can  obtain  this  fire  at  a 
short  distance  from  the   enemy  ;    as,   on   such 
ground,  ricochet  shots  do  not  rise  much.     But 
where  the  ground  is  uneven,  to  obtain  such  a 


62          TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  AKMS.      . 

fire,    a  more   distant    position   will   be   requi 
site. 

7.  Muddy  ground  is  unfavorable  for  artil 
lery.  Over  such  ground,  its  carriages  move 
slowly,  and  its  fire  is  less  effective.  Balls  can 
not  ricochet ;  and  shells  often  sink  into  the 
mud,  and  thus  are  either  extinguished  or  ex 
plode  with  but  little  effect. 

Napoleon  depended  so  much  on  his  artillery 
at  Waterloo  that,  although  every  moment  was 
precious,  he  delayed  commencing  the  battle  till 
his  chief  of  artillery  had  reported  the  ground, 
which  had  been  covered  by  a  soaking  rain,  to 
be  sufficiently  dry  for  the  movements  and  effec 
tiveness  of  that  arm.  The  three  hours'  delay 
thus  caused,  would  have  sufficed  him  to  crush 
Wellington's  army  before  the  arrival  of  the 
Prussians. 

8.  Stony  ground  is  a  bad  location  for  a  bat 
tery  ;  for  the  enemy's  shot  will  scatter  the  stones 
around  it  with  more  or  less  fatal  effect. 

9.  Hough  or  uneven  ground  immediately  in 
front  of  a  battery  is  not  objectionable,  as  it  will 
stop  the  enemy' s  shot. 

10.  A  battery,  when  it  is  possible  to  avoid  it, 
should  not  be  posted  within  musket  range  of 
woods,   bushes,    ravines,    hedges,    ditches,    or 


TACTICAL   USE  OF  ARTILLERY.  63 

other  coyer  from  which  the  enemy's  sharpshoot 
ers  might  kill  off  the  gunners,  or,  by  a  sudden 
dash,  capture  the  guns. 

11.  To  prevent  the  enemy  from  approaching 
a  battery  under  cover,  it  should  be  so  placed  as 
to  be  able  to  sweep  all  milages,  liollows,  and 
woods,  in  front  and  in  flank. 

12.  In  taking  up  a  position,  a  battery  should 
avail  itself  of  all  inequalities  of  the  ground,  for 
the  shelter  of  its  pieces  and  gunners,  or  of  its 
limbers  and  caissons,  at  least. 

For  the  same  purpose,  a  battery  posted  on 
an  eminence  should  have  its  pieces  some  ten 
paces  behind  its  crest. 

13.  Where  the  ground  affords  no   shelter, 
and  where  the  position  of  the  guns  is  not  likely 
to  be  changed,  it  may  be  worth  while  to  cover 
them  by  an  epaulement  or  breastwork,  some 
three  feet,  or  more,  high. 

II.-— How  posted  with  respect  to  our  own 
Troops. 

1.  In  order  to  be  ready  to  support  the  flanks 
of  our  attacking  columns,  and  to  aid  in  the 
defence  in  every  part  of  the  field,  batteries 
should  be  placed  at  several  different  points  in 
the  line  of  battle. 


64          TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

2.  In  a  defensive  battle  especially,  as  it  is 
uncertain  on  what  point  the  enemy  will  mass 
his  principal  attack,  the  artillery  should  usually 
Ibe  distributed  through  the  whole  line. 

3.  A  line  of  battle  has  been  compared  to  the 
front  of  a  fortification,  of  which  the  infantry  is 

the  curtain,  and  the  artillery  batteries  the  bas 
tions. 

4.  The  lighter  guns  should  be  placed  on  the 
salient  points  of  our  line,  from  which  they  can 
be  more  easily  withdrawn ;  the  heavier  guns, 
constituting  the  stationary  batteries,  on  the  more 
retired  points. 

5.  Pieces  should  not  be  placed  in  prolonga 
tion  with  troops  ;  for  this  would  be  giving  the 
enemy  a  double  mark.    Artillery  posted  in  front 
of  other  troops  will  draw  a  fire  on  them.    When 
a  battery  must  be  placed  in  front  of  the  line,  let 
the  infantry  in  rear  of  it  clear  the  ground  by 
ploying  into  double  columns. 

6.  Never  place  artillery  so  as  to  impede  the 
movements  of  the  other  two  arm-s.     A  battery 
posted  in  front  of  the  centre  would  often  ham 
per  the  movements  of  the  infantry ;  besides  be 
ing  peculiarly  exposed  to  a  converging  lire  from 
the  enemy' s  batteries. 

7.  The   safest  position  for  a  battery  is  on 


TACTICAL  USE   OF  ARTILLERY.  65 

that  wing  which  is  most  secure  from  a  flank 
attack. 

But  guns  should  re-enforce  the  weaker  points, 
thus  making  the  enemy  attack  the  strongest 
ones. 

Therefore,  where  a  wing  is  weak,  place  the 
largest  number  of  guns  there,  to  support  it.  If 
we  have  one  wing  entirely  uncovered,  of  four 
batteries,  for  instance,  we  should  give  three  to 
the  uncovered  wing. 

8.  Of   the  heavy  batteries,    one,    at    least, 
should  be  placed  in  the  first  line,  so  that  we 
may  be  able  to  open  an  effective  fire  on  the  ene 
my  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 

9.  The  prompt  use,  at  the  proper  moment,  of 
the  reserve,  may  decide  the  battle.     The  move 
ments  of  heavy  artillery,  therefore,  are  too  slow 
for  the  reserve,  which  should  have  most  of  the 
light  pieces.     Horse  artillery  is  especially  suit 
able  for  it. 

10.  Guns  near  an  infantry  square  should  be 
posted  at  its  angles.     If  the  square  is  charged 
by  cavalry,  the  gunners  run  into  the  square, 
after  filling  their  ammunition  pouches,  which 
they  take  in  with  them,  as  well  as  their  sponges 
and  other  equipments.     The  limbers  and  cais 
sons  are  sent  to  the  rear ;  or,  if  there  is  no  time 


(36         TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  TIIEEE  AEMS. 

to  do  this,  they  may  "be  brought  into  the  square. 
If  this  is  impossible,  they  may  be  formed  into  a 
barricade. 

At  Waterloo,  on  the  Erench  cavalry's  re 
tiring  from  their  charges  on  the  enemy's  squares, 
the  British  gunners  rushed  out  from  the  squares 
in  which  they  had  taken  refuge,  and  plied  their 
guns  on  the  retiring  squadrons. 

III.— How  posted  with  respect  to  the  Enemy. 

1.  If  the  enemy's  batteries  are  concentrated 
in  one  position,  by  placing  our  own  batteries 
properly  we  may  obtain  a  powerful  cross-fire 
on  them. 

2.  It  is  always  advantageous  to  so  dispose 
our  batteries  as  to  take  those  of  the  enemy  in 
enfilade,   or   obliquely   (en   echarpe,    as   it   is 
called).  « 

At  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro' ,  in  December, 
1862,  a  rebel  battery,  being  taken  in  enfilade  by 
one  of  our  own,  was  silenced  in  about  five  min 
utes. 

3.  So,  also,  if  we  can  obtain  an  oblique  or 
enfilading  fire  on  Ms  troops,  it  will  be  very  de 
structive.     A  flanking  battery,  raking  the  ene 
my's  position,  is  often  enough,  of  itself,  to  decide 
a  battle. 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  ARTILLERY.       67 

Thus,  the  battle  of  Cliippewa  was  finally  de 
cided  by  our  getting  a  gun  or  two  in  a  flanking 
position,  enabling  us  to  enfilade  the  British  line. 

So,  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  the  rebels'  trium 
phant  advance  on  the  evening  of  the  first  day 
was  effectually  checked  by  the  fire  of  our  gun 
boats  Tyler  and  Lexington,  which  had  taken  an 
enfilading  position  opposite  their  right  flank. 

4.  For  this  reason,  we  must  never  post  one 
of  our  own  batteries  so  that  the  enemy's  guns 
will  take  it  obliquely,  or  in  flank ;  unless,  in 
deed,   by  doing  so,  we  may  probably  obtain 
some  important  and  decisive  effect  before  it  can 
be  destroyed,  or  made  unservipeable. 

5.  Batteries  should  be  so  placed  as  to  com 
mand  the  wliole  ground  in  our  front,   even 
almost  up  to  our  bayonets,  and  so  as  to  be  able 
to  direct  their  fire  towards  every  point ;  at  all 
events,  so  that  a  fire  can  be  kept  up  on  the 
enemy  till  he  is  within  short  musket-range. 

It  is  manifest  that  the  best  position  for  a  bat 
tery,  to  enable  it  to  effectually  cover  the  entire 
ground  in  our  front,  would  not  be  in  our  line  of 
battle,  but  in  advance  of  one  of  its  flanks,  from 
which  it  could  take  the  enemy's  troops  advan 
cing  over  it,  in  enfilade. 

6.  Artillery  fire  from  an  unexpected  quarter 


68          TACTICAL  USE   OF  THE  THREE  ATCMS. 

always  lias  a  powerful  moral  effect.  Two  guns, 
even,  hoisted  up  to  a  place  where  the  enemy 
does  not  dream  of  there  being  any,  may  have  a 
decisive  effect. 


IV.— Posting  of  Batteries  and  of  Pieces  as 
between  themselves. 

1.  The  best  mode  of  posting  batteries  is  in 
the  form  of  a  crescent,  its  horns  pointing  towards 
the  enemy,  or  forming  the  sides  of  a  re-entering 
angle ;  for  this  gives  a  convergent  fire  to  the 
enemy' s  divergent  one. 

Its  inconvenience  is,  the  exposure  of  its 
flanks  to  attack,  or  to  enfilade.  Therefore, 
when  such  a  position  is  adopted,  its  flanks  must 
be  protected  by  natural  obstacles  or  by  artificial 
defences. 

2.  Batteries,  or  parts  of  batteries,  should  be 
at  supporting  distances  from  eacli  other ;  that 
is,  not  over  six  hundred  yards  apart,  so  as  to 
effectually   cover   the   whole    ground  between 
them,  in  case  of  need,  with  grape  and  canister. 
When  rifled  guns  are  used,  this  distance  may  be 
increased. 

3.  A  long  line  of  guns  in  our  line  of  battle  is 
objectionable  ;   for,  if  it  should  become  neces- 


TACTICAL   USE   OF  AKTILLEKY.  G9 

sary  to  withdraw  them,  they  would  leave  a 
dangerous  interval. 

4.  It  is  dangerous  to  collect  a  great  many 
pieces  in  one  battery,  especially  in  the  begin 
ning  of  an  action,  when  the  enemy  is  fresh,  for 
it  strongly  tempts  him  to   capture  it.     When 
used,  such  a  battery  should  have  powerful  sup 
ports  to  protect  it,  or  should  be  sheltered  by  a 
village,  a  defile,  or  other  cover,  occupied  before 
hand. 

5.  Although,  to  be  used  offensively,  guns 
should  be  in  strong  masses,  in  order  to  strike  a 
decisive  blow  on  some  single  point ;  this  is  by 
no  means  the  case  when  used  defensively  ;  for, 

(1.)  It  is  only  when  guns  are  more  or  less 
scattered  over  different  parts  of  the  field,  that 
they  can  be  made  to  give  a  cross-fire  on  the  ene 
my's  advancing  columns,  or  on  any  part  of  his 
line. 

(2.)  If  the  position  where  they  are  massed 
does  not  happen  to  be  attacked,  they  become 
useless,  while  stripping  the  rest  of  the  line. 

(3.)  If  they  are  captured,  all  the  artillery  is 
lost  at  once,  as  happened  to  the  Austrians  at  the 
battle  of  Leuthen,  causing  their  defeat. 

6.  A  certain  number  of  pieces  of  horse-artil 
lery  must  always  be  kept  in  reserve,  so  that,  if 


70         TACTICAL  USE   OF  THE  THEEE  ARMS. 

an  artillery  fire  at  any  point  should  be  suddenly 
wanted,  it  may  be  furnished  with  the  least  pos 
sible  delay. 

7.  Guns  of  various  calibres  should  never  be 
in  the  same  battery,  to  prevent  confusion  as  to 
the  respective  ranges,  and  in  the  supply  of  their 
ammunition. 

8.  An  independent  section  or  battery  should 
never  consist  of  howitzers  alone,  for  the  proper 
fire  of  these  pieces  is  too  slow  to  be  effective  in 
repulsing  an  attack  on  them. 

9.  There  should  always  be  wide  intervals 
between  the  pieces  ;  otherwise  the  battery  would 
offer  too  good  a  mark  to  the  enemy. 

V.— How  u§cd. 

First,  GENERALLY. 
Secondly,  IN  OFFENSIVE  COMBAT. 
Thirdly,  IN  DEFENSIVE  COMBAT. 
Fourthly,  AGAINST  INFANTRY. 
Fifthly,-  AGAINST  CAVALRY. 
Lastly,  AGAINST  ARTILLERY. 

A.  GENERALLY. 

1.  So  far  as  is  possible,  guns  should  be  kept 
Jiiddenfrom  tlie  enemy  till  the  moment  of  open- 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  AKTILLEKY.       71 

ing  on  him.  They  may  be  masked  by  the 
ground,  or  other  cover,  natural  or  artificial,  or 
by  troops  placed  in  front  of  them.  The  surprise 
will  add  much  to  their  effect.  Moreover,  con 
cealed,  they  will  be  less  exposed  to  be  taken. 
Nothing  discourages  troops  more  than  the  loss 
of  a  battery  at  the  beginning  of  an  action. 

2.  A  desultory  and  indiscriminate  artillery 
fire  will   accomplish  nothing.      To    effect  any 
thing    important,  it  must  be  concentrated  on 
some  object ;  and  the  fire  must  be  persevered  in 
till  the  desired  effect  has  been  produced. 

3.  It  is  a  general  principle    that  artillery 
should  not  reply  to  the  enemy's  batteries,  un 
less  compelled  to  by  their  effect  on  our  own 
troops.     To  obtain  the  most  decisive  effects  from 
artillery  fire,  it  should  be  directed  on  the  ene 
my's  troops,  instead  of  his  guns. 

4.  If  it  should  become  advisable  to  silence 
one    of   his    batteries,   it  will    be  done    more 
promptly  and  effectually  by  the  employment, 
for  this  purpose,  of  two  of  our  own  batteries, 
than  of  a  single  one. 

5.  There  is  usually  great  advantage  in  keep 
ing  our  batteries  constantly  shifting  their  posi 
tion  ;  for  then— 

(1.)  They  have  the  effect  of  a  surprise,  by 


72          TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE   ARMS. 

opening    on    the    enemy  at   some   unexpected 
point. 

(2.)  They  make  the  enemy  believe  our  guns 
to  be  more  numerous  than  they  really  are. 

(3.)  They  are  in  less  danger  of  being  cap 
tured. 

But  these  changes  of  position  are  attended 
with  this  inconvenience,  that  they  expose  the 
horses  to  be  taken  in  flank  by  the  enemy's  bat 
teries  and  sharpshooters. 

6.  The  movements  of  a  battery  in  the  field 
should  be  as  rapid  as  possible ;  for,  while 
moving,  it  is  helpless  and  exposed. 

Moreover,  celerity  of  movement  and  accu 
racy  of  fire  will  often  more  than  compensate  for 
inferiority  in  the  number  of  guns ;  as  was  the 
case  at  the  battle  of  Palo  Alto,  in  the  Mexican 
War,  where  the  enemy's  guns  outnumbered 
ours  two  to  one. 

B.  IN  OFFENSIVE  COMBAT. 

1.  When  used  to  prepare  for  an  attack  of 
infantry  or  cavalry,    artillery  concentrates    as 
much  fire  as  possible  on  the  point  where  the 
attack  is  to  be  made,  in  order  to  overcome  the 
resistance  there,  and  thus  make  success  easy. 

2.  When  there  are  several  points  on  which 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  ARTILLERY.       73 

our  fire  should  be  directed,  we  must  not  batter 
them  all  at  once,  but  concentrate  our  whole  fire 
on  them  in  succession. 

3.  In  attack,  artillery  should  not  be  split  up 
among  different  brigades  or  divisions ;  else  no 
decisive  result  can  be  expected  from  it    Whole 
batteries,  used  together,  will  have  a  more  tell 
ing  effect  than  if  scattered  over  the  field  in  sep 
arate  sections. 

In  no  case  should  less  than  two  pieces  be 
used  together;  for,  while  one  piece  is  being 
loaded,  the  piece  and  its  gunners  need  the  pro 
tection  of  another  one  ready  to  be  discharged. 

4.  Pieces  in  support  of  an  infantry  column 
of  attack  should  never  be  in  its  rear,  but  on  its 

flanks,  near  its  head,  in  which  position  it  will 
best  encourage  the  infantry.  But  if  a  battery 
have  already  a  position  from  which  it  can  afford 
to  the  attack  effective  assistance,  it  should  re 
main  in  it ;  sending  a  few  pieces  to  accompany 
the  infantry,  which  alway  sgreatly  values  artil 
lery  support 

5.  Powerful  effects  may  be  produced  by  the 
sudden  assemblage  of  a  great  number  of  guns 
on  some  particular  point.     This  was  a  favorite 
manoeuvre  of  Napoleon ;  who,  by  his  rapid  con 
centration  of  immense  batteries  of  light  artillery 


74         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  TIIKEE  AEMS. 

on-  the  important  point,  usually  obtained  the 
most  decisive  results.  At  Wagram,  for  instance, 
when  Macdonald's  column  was  ready  to  make 
its  great  charge  on  the  Austrian  centre,  Napo 
leon  suddenly  massed  one  hundred  guns  in 
front  of  his  own  centre,  and  made  it  advance  in 
double  column  at  a  trot,  then  deploy  into  line 
on  the  leading  section,  and  concentrate  its  fire 
on  the  villages  forming  the  keys  to  the  enemy's 
position,  in  front  of  his  right  and  left  wings  re 
spectively  ;  each  battery  opening  its  fire  on  ar 
riving  at  half-range  distance.  The  effect  was 
overwhelming. 

6.  The  nearer  artillery  delivers  its  fire,  the 
more  powerful,  of  course,  are  its  effects.     Horse 
artillery,   in  sufficient   strength,    attacking  the 
enemy  at  short  grape-shot  distance,  say  within 
three  hundred  or  four  hundred  yards,  may  lose 
half  its  pieces,  but  with  the  other  half  it  will 
probably  decide  the  battle  at  that  point. 

At  Palo  Alto,  Duncan's  rapid  closing  with 
his  guns  to  less  than  half  range,  drove  back  the 
Mexican  right  wing,  which  could  not  stand  the 
destructive  fire. 

7.  Horse    artillery    does    not    usually    at 
tempt  to  follow  up  cavalry  in  its  attack ;  but 
takes  a  position  to  cover  its  retreat,  if  repulsed, 


TACTICAL   USE   OP  ARTILLERY.  75 

or  to  push  forward  in  support,  in  case  of  suc 
cess. 

8.  When  cavalry  has  to  debouch  from  a  de 
file,  horse  artillery  may  render  it  most  effectual 
assistance,  by  taking  a  position  that  will  en 
able  the  cavalry  to  form  without  fear  of  being 
charged  and  destroyed  while  forming. 

C.  IN  DEFENSIVE  COMBAT. 

1.  Artillery  should  always  reserve  its  fire 
till  the  enemy's  real  attack. 

2.  It  should  play  on  that  portion  of  the  hos 
tile  force  that  threatens  us  most. 

3.  It  should  wait  till  the  enemy  has  .come 
within  destructive  distance,  and  then  open  on 
his  columns  with  a  concentrated  fire. 

4.  It  should  protect  our  troops  while  ma 
noeuvring,  and  accompany  them  in  retreat, 

5.  We  must  subdivide  our  batteries  when 
ever  we  wish  to  obtain  cross-fires  on  a  debouche, 
or  on  the  head  of  an  advancing  column,  or  on 
the  ground  in  front  of  a  weak  part  of  our  line. 
By  so  doing,  we  compel  the  enemy  to  divide  his 
own  artillery  in  order  to  reply  to  our  fire. 

6.  A  sudden  concentration  of  a  great  num 
ber  of  guns  at  some  particular  point  may  be 
used  with  the  same  decisive  effect  in  a  defen- 


76        TACTICAL  USE   OF  THE  THEEE  ARMS. 

sive,  as  in  an  offensive  battle ;  though  in  this 
case,  artillery  plays,  for  the  time  being,  a  part 
strictly  offensive. 

At  the  battle  of  Friedland,  where  the  French 
were  attacked  by  the  Russians  in  overwhelming 
numbers,  Key's  corps  was  driven  back  by  a 
terrific  concentrated  fire,  in  front  and  in  flank, 
from  the  Russian  batteries  on  the  opposite  side 
of  the  river ;  its  own  artillery  being  too  feeble 
to  stand  before  them.      Seeing  this,  Napoleon 
instantly  ordered  all  the  guns  of  the  different 
divisions  of  the  corps  next  to  Key's,  on  the  left, 
to  be  united  and  thrown  in  one  mass  in  front  of 
Ney's  corps.      Taking  post  at  some  hundred 
paces  in  front,  these  batteries,  by  their  power 
ful  fire,   soon  silenced  the  Russian  batteries; 
then  advancing  on  the  Russian  troops  that  had 
crossed  the  river  to  within  grape-shot  range, 
they  made  frightful  havoc  in  their  deep  masses. 
The  French  infantry,  profiting  by  this,  rushed 
forward  and  captured  the  village  of  Friedland, 
driving  the  enemy  in  their  front  over  the  bridges, 
which  they  then  burned.     This  was  decisive  of 
the  battle;  for  the  whole  Russian  army  was 
then  driven  into  the  river. 

So,  at  the  battle  of  Kunersdorff,  in  1759, 
after  Frederick's  left  and  centre  had  driven  the 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  ARTILLERY.       77 

Russians,  and  captured*  seventy  guns  and  many 
prisoners,  Soltikoff  promptly  massed  the  whole 
artillery  of  his  right  wing  at  a  single  point  be 
hind  a  ravine,  which,  by  its  concentrated  fire, 
swept  away  the  flower  of  the  Prussian  army  in 
their  efforts  to  force  its  passage  ;  and  Frederick 
was  badly  defeated. 

7.  When  compelled  to  retreat,  guns  should 
retire  successively,  in  echelons  of  batteries,  half- 
batteries,  or  sections,  in  order  that  the  fire  of 
one  may  cover  the  limbering  up  and  retreat  of 
another. 

Besides  the  mutual  support  thereby  afforded, 
these  successive  face-abouts  of  artillery  have  a 
powerful  moral  effect  on  the  pursuing  enemy, 
already  more  or  less  disorganized  by  success. 

It  would  be  well  for  some  pieces  in  each 
echelon  to  be  kept  loaded  with  canister,  so  as  to 
drive  the  enemy  back  if  he  should  press  very 
close. 

8.  The  protection  afforded  by  artillery  in  re 
treat  is  very  powerful,  as  it  keeps  the  enemy 
constantly  at  a  distance. 

A  fine  example  of  the  use  of  it  for  this  pur 
pose  occurred  just  before  the  battle  of  Pea 
Ridge,  in  March,  1862.  A  rear-guard  of  six 
hundred  men,  under  General  Sigel,  was  retreat- 


78         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  TIIEEE  AKMS. 

ing  before  a  force  of  four  regiments  of  infantry 
and  cavalry,  that  followed  and  attacked  it  on 
every  side.  Sigel  disposed  Ms  guns  in  echelons, 
the  one  of  which  nearest  the  enemy  played  on 
his  attacking  squadrons  with  grape  and  shell, 
which  suddenly  checked  them.  Instantly  profit 
ing  by  their  temporary  hesitation,  the  echelon 
limbered  up  and  galloped  away  to  another  posi 
tion,  while  the  next  echelon,  again  checking  the 
enemy  by  its  fire,  followed  its  example.  By 
this  means,  Sigel,  cutting  his  way  through  a 
vastly  superior  force,  succeeded,  after  a  retreat 
of  ten  miles,  in  rejoining  the  main  body  with 
but  trifling  loss. 

9.  If  driven  to  the  last  extremity,  the  gun 
ners  should  try,  at  least,  to  save  the  liorses,  and 
to  blow  up  the  caissons  they  have  to  abandon. 

At  the  battle  of  La  Rothiere,  in  1814,  where 
Napoleon,  with  thirty-two  thousand  men,  w^as 
overwhelmed  by  one  hundred  thousand  Allies, 
and  was  obliged  to  leave  fifty  guns  on  the  field, 
he  succeeded  in  bringing  off  all  his  gunners  and 
horses. 


D.  AGAINST 

1.    It    is    an   important   rule   that   artillery 

should  play  on  the   enemy's  troops,  without 


TACTICAL    USE   OF   ARTILLERY.  79 

attending    to    Ms   batteries,    except    in   urgent 
cases. 

2.  Against  a  deployed  line,  whether  march 
ing  by  the  front  or  by  a  flank,  case-shot,  that  is, 
grape,  canister,  and  spherical  case  (sometimes 
called  shrapnel),  are  most  suitable ;  as  these  all 
scatter,  right  and  left,  to  a  considerable  dis 
tance. 

The  best  effect  of  canister  is  within  two  hun 
dred  yards.  Beyond  three  hundred  and  fifty 
yards,  it  should  not  be  used. 

The  best  effect  of  grape  is  within  four  hun 
dred  yards.  Over  six  hundred  yards,  it  is  not 
very  effective. 

Spherical  case  is  effective  at  much  greater 
distances,  its  range  being  nearly  equal  to  that  of 
solid  shot. 

Against  a  line  of  infantry  at  a  greater  dis 
tance  than  six  hundred  yards,  spherical  case 
should  be  used,  chiefly,  if  not  exclusively ;  as 
being  more  likely  to  be  effective  than  ball. 

3.  But  case-shot  are  unsuitable  against  a 
column,  as  they  consist  of  a  number  of  small 
balls  which  have  not  momentum  enough  to 
penetrate  into  it  to  any  depth.  When  the  ene 
my  advances  in  columns,  solid  shot  should 
plough  through  them  from  head  to  rear,  a 


80         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THEEE   ARMS. 

cross-fire  "being  obtained  upon  them  when  pos 
sible. 

4.  Especially  should  round-shot  be  used 
against  a  close  column  rushing  to  attack  us 
through  a  defile.  Grape  and  canister  might 
sweep  down  the  leading  ranks,  but  the  mass 
of  the  column  sees  not  the  destructive  effect ; 
and  being  carried  forward  by  the  pressure  of 
the  ranks  behind,  continues  to  rush  on  till  the 
battery  is  carried,  though  with  more  or  less 
loss. 

At  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines,  on  one  occa 
sion,  when  the  rebels  were  advancing  in  close 
columns,  they  were  plied  with  grape  and  canis 
ter  from  two  of  our  batteries  with  but  little 
effect.  Every  discharge  made  wide  gaps  in 
their  leading  ranks,  but  these  were  instantly 
filled  again,  and  the  columns  pressed  on. 

A  round-shot,  on  the  other  hand,  comes 
shrieking  and  tearing  its  way  through  the  entire 
column,  carrying  destruction  to  the  very  rear 
most  ranks.  The  hesitation  produced  is  not 
limited  to  the  leading  ranks,  but  extends 
throughout  the  column.  Thus  both  the  actual 
and  the  moral  effect  of  ball  on  a  close  column 
is  much  superior  to  that  of  grape  or  canister. 

At  the  bridge  of  Lodi,  the  Austrian  gunners 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   AKTILLERY.  81 

plied  the  French  column  with  grape.  If  they 
had  used  round-shot  instead,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  Bonaparte  would  have  succeeded  in 
carrying  the  bridge. 

5.  But  a  direct  fire  with  ball  on  the  head  of 
a  column  of  attack  would  be  much  assisted  by 
the  fire  of  a  few  light  pieces  taking  it  in  flank. 
And,  for  this  fire  in  flank,  case-shot  would  be 
powerfully  effective  ;  for,  from  their  wide  scat 
tering,  both  their  actual  and  their  moral  effects 
would  extend  through  the  whole  column,  from 
front  to  rear. 

6.  A  battery  with  guns  enough  to  Jceep  up  a 
continuous  fire  has  little  to  fear  from  an  open 
attack  on  it  by  infantry  alone.     Napoleon  ob 
served  that  no  infantry,  without  artillery,  can 
march  one  thousand  yards  on  a  battery  of  six 
teen  guns,  well  directed  and  served  ;  for,  before 
clearing  two-thirds  of  the  way,  they  will  have 
been  all  killed,  wounded,  or  dispersed. 

This  remark  was  made  in  reference  to  smooth 
bore  guns ;  the  new  rifled  guns  should  be  still 
more  destructive. 

7.  Against  skirmishers,  as  they  offer  but  a 
poor  mark  for  ball,  grape  and  canister  should 
alone  be  used. 

4* 


82         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  TIIKEE  AKMS. 


E.  AGAINST  CAVALKY. 

1.  The  ground  round  a  battery  should  be  so 
obstructed  as  to  prevent  the  enemy*  s  cavalry 

from  closing  on  it ;  but  in  the  case  of  a  light 
battery,  intended  for  manoeuvre,  so  far  only  as 
this  can  be  done  without  impeding  the  move 
ments  of  the  battery  itself. 

2.  On  being  threatened  by  cavalry,  a  light 
battery  may  sometimes  promptly  change  its  po 
sition  to  one  where  the  cavalry  would  attack  it 
at  great  disadvantage.     For  instance,  if  posted 
on  an  eminence,  and  cavalry  should  attempt  to 
carry  it  by  charging  up  the   slope,  instead  of 
awaiting  the  charge  in  a  position  which  would 
allow  the  cavalry  to  recover  breath,  and  form 
on  the  height,  it  might  run  its  pieces  forward  to 
the  very  brow  of  the  slope,  where  the  cavalry, 
having  lost  their  impetus,  and  with  their  horses 
blown,  would  be  nearly  helpless  and  easily  re 
pulsed. 

3.  At  a  distance,  the  most  effective  fire  on 
cavalry  is  with  Jwwitzers,  on  account  of  the  ter 
ror  and  confusion  caused  among  the  horses  by 
the  bursting  of  the  shells. 

On  the  cavalry's  flanks,  when  within  four 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  ARTILLERY.       83 

hundred  or  five  hundred  yards,  the  fire  with 
grape  would  be  most  effective. 

4.  The  last  discharge  should  be  of  canister 
alone,  and  made  by  all  the  pieces  at  once,  when 
the  battery  should  be  swiftly  withdrawn. 

5.  If  the   cavalry  succeed  in  reaching  the 
pieces  before  their  withdrawal,  the  gunners  may 
find  temporary  refuge  under  the  carriages. 

F.   AGAINST  ARTILLERY. 

1.  As  guns  in  the  field  should  generally  play 
on  troops  instead  of  batteries,  there  should  be  a 
reserve  of  horse  artillery  to  take  the  enemy's 
batteries  in  flank,  in  case  of  need,  as  well  as  for 
other  purposes. 

2.  Though  the  ordinary  use  of  artillery  is 
against  infantry  and  cavalry  only,  special  cir 
cumstances  may  render  it  expedient  that  a  cer 
tain  portion  of  it  should  respond  to  the  enemy's 
batteries.    In  this  case,  not  over  one-third  should 
be  used  for  that  purpose. 

3.  When  we  have  guns  in  abundance,  it 
might  be  sometimes  advisable,  by  using  several 
batteries  at  once,  to  silence  the  enemy's  guns, 
before  beginning  to  play  on  his  troops. 

4.  Artillery  properly  plays  on  the  enemy's 
guns — 


84         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

» 

(1.)  At  the  moment  of  their  coming  into  ac 
tion,  for  then  they  are  so  exposed  that  our  fire 
will  "be  peculiarly  effective,  and  perhaps  to  such 
a  degree  as  to  prevent  their  opening  on  us. 

(2.)  When  our  troops  move  forward  to  at 
tack,  in  order  to  draw  away  from  them  the  fire 
of  the  enemy' s  "batteries,  or,  at  least,  to  render  it 
unsteady,  inaccurate,  and  ineffective  ;  and 

(3.)  Generally,  when  his  guns  are  causing  us 
very  great  damage. 

5.  Against  guns,  solid  shot  or  shells  only 
should  be  used,  since  they  alone  are  capable  of 
inflicting  any  serious  injury  on  either  guns  or 
their  carriages :  solid  shot,  by  their  great  weight 
and  momentum  ;  shells,  by  their  bursting. 

But  within  three  hundred  or  four  hundred 
yards,  grape  and  canister  would  soon  destroy 
the  gunners  and  the  horses. 

6.  Our  fire  on  a  hostile  battery  would  not  only 
be  very  effective  when  it  is  coming  into  action, 
but  at  all  other  times  when  its  flanks  are  ex 
posed  /  as  in  limbering  up  to  move  off,  or  in  a 
flank  march.     On  these  occasions  we  should  use 
grape,  if  near  enough  ;  otherwise,  spherical  case 
would  be  generally  the  best. 

7.  When  possible  to  avoid  it,  a  field  lattery 
should  not  ~be  opposed  to  a  battery  of  position, 


TACTICAL   USE   OF  ARTILLERY.  85 

or,  generally,  a  "battery  of  light  guns  to  one  of 
heavy  guns.  For  even  when  the  numbers  of 
pieces  on  the  two  sides  are  equal,  the  enemy's 
superiority  in  range  and  in  weight  of  metal 
would  give  him  such  advantage  in  the  duel 
that  our  own  battery  would  soon  be  destroyed 
or  silenced. 

VI.— Its  Fire. 

1.  It  is  important  not  to  commence  the  fire 
till  our  guns  are  in  sure  range — 

(1.)  Because  a  harmless  fire  serves  but  to 
embolden  the  enemy  and  discourage  our  own 
troops. 

(2.)  Because  artillery  ammunition  should 
never  be  wasted.  The  fate  of  a  battle  will 
sometimes  depend  on  there  being  a  sufficient 
supply  of  it  at  a  particular  moment. 

2.  The  usual  maximum  distances  at  which 
smooth-bore  field  guns  may  open  fire  with  any 
considerable  effect,  are— 

For  12-pounders       .     .     .     1100  yards. 
For    6        "  ...       750       " 

What  these  distances  are  in  respect  to  rifled 
guns,  it  does  not  appear  to  be  yet  definitively 


86         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

settled.  The  extreme  range  of  the  new  rifled 
six- pounders  is  said  to  be  three  thousand  yards  ; 
of  the  twelve-pounders,  four  thousand  five  hun 
dred  yards. 

3.  Guns  are  usually  fired  by  order,  and  not 
by  salvos,   or  volleys ;    and  never  as  soon  as 
loaded,   unless  delay  be  dangerous.     Artillery 
fire  is  formidable  only  in  proportion  to  its  accu 
racy  ;  and  this  is  attainable  only  by  a  cool  and 
calculated  aim. 

4.  Artillery  fire  should  never  cease  through 
the  whole  line  at  once.     This  would  have  a  dis 
couraging  effect  on  our  own  troops,  and  an  in 
spiriting  one  on  the  enemy' s.     Especially  must 
this  not  be  done  when  we  are  about  to  execute 
any  manoeuvre  ;  for  it  would  be  sure  to  call  the 
enemy's  attention  to  it. 

Therefore,  if  a  particular  battery  has  to 
change  its  position,  it  must  not  cease  the  fire  of 
all  its  pieces  at  once ;  for,  besides  its  disquiet 
ing  effect  on  our  troops,  it  would  notify  the 
enemy  of  the  movement. 

5.  In  covering  an  attack,   our  guns  should 
keep  up  their  fire  till  the  moment  it  would  be 
gin  to  endanger  our  advancing  columns. 

6.  By  a  ricochet  fire,  artillery  is  said  to  in 
crease  its  effect,  from  one-fourth  to  one-half.     It 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   ARTILLERY.  87 

is  especially  effective  in  enfilading  a  line  of 
troops,  a  battery,  or  the  face  of  a  work  taken  in 
flank. 

Ricochet  shots  have  also  great  moral  effect. 

7.  When  used  against  breastworJcs  of  rails 
or  logs  of  wood,  guns  should  be  fired  with  mod 
erate  or  shattering  charges ;  so  as  more  surely 
to  demolish  them,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  in 
crease  the  destructive  effect  of  the  fire  by  scat 
tering  the  splinters. 

In  view  of  the  frequent  necessity  of  batter 
ing  such  defences,  and  of  using  a  ricochet  fire, 
which  also  requires  small  charges  of  powder,  it 
would  be  an  improvement  in  our  artillery  ser 
vice  to  make  a  certain  proportion  of  the  ammu 
nition  in  each  gun  limber  to  consist  of  cartridges 
of  half  the  usual  size. 

8.  In  bombarding  a  milage  during  a  battle, 
if  our  object  be  to  set  fire  to  and  destroy  it,  this 
will  be  best  accomplished  with  shells.     If  we 
wish  merely  to  drive  the  enemy  from  it,  solid 
shot    from   heavy  calibres  will  be  necessary, 
which  will  more  surely  reach  and  destroy  his 
troops,  wherever  they  may  show  themselves. 

9.  The  moral  effect,  both  of  solid  shot  and  of 
shells,   is  much  greater  than  that  of  grape  or 
other  case-shot,  from  their  more  fearful  effects 


88    TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THEEE  ARMS. 

on  the  human  frame,  and  from  the  great  number 
of  men  that  a  single  ball  or  shell  will  kill  or 
fatally  wound.  One  twelve-pound  solid  shot 
has  been  known  to  kill  forty-two  men,  who 
happened  to  be  exactly  in  its  range. 

10.  Ball  and  shell  should  be  used— 
(1.)  When  the  enemy  is  at  a  distance. 
(2.)  When  he  is  in  mass. 

(3.)  When  he  is  in  several  lines. 
(4.)  When  his  line  may  be  enfiladed. 

11.  In  silencing  a  battery,  our  fire  should  be 
concentrated  on  one  piece  at  a  time,  while  some 
of  our  guns  throw  spherical  case,  from  a  rak 
ing  position,  if  possible,  on  the  gunners. 

12.  Though  grape  has  a  much  less  range 
than  ball,  yet  within  four  hundred  yards,  on 
account  of  its  scattering,  its  effect  is  superior 
to  it. 

The  fire  of  guns  double  shotted  with  ball  and 
a  stand  of  grape,  is  fearfully  destructive  when 
used  at  a  short  distance  to  repel  a  charge. 

13.  It  is  artillerymen's  point  of  honor  not  to 
abandon  their  pieces  till  the  last  extremity. 
They  should  always  remember  that  when  the 
enemy  is  closing  on  them,  the  last  discharge  will 
be  the  most  destructive  of  all,  and  may  suffice 
to  repulse  the  attack  and  turn  the  tide  of  battle. 


TACTICAL   USE   OF  AKTILLEKY.  89 

In  our  attack  on  Quebec,  in  our  War  of  In 
dependence,  on  the  near  approach  of  our  as 
saulting  column,  the  British  gunners  fled  from 
their  pieces ;  but  the  one  who  fled  last,  before 
leaving,  discharged  his  gun,  which  was  loaded 
with  grape.  The  discharge  killed  and  wounded 
several  of  our  men  ;  among  them  the  brave  Gen 
eral  Montgomery,  who  was  leading  the  column 
in  person.  The  effect  was  decisive.  The  assail 
ants  fell  back,  panic- struck  at  the  loss  of  their 
commander  ;  and  our  attack  failed. 

14.  To  prevent  our  own  captured  pieces  from 
being  turned  on  us  by  the  enemy,  it  is  the  artil 
lerymen's  last  duty,  when  it  has  become  evident 
that  the  guns  cannot  be  saved,  to  spike  them. 
The  operation  requiring  but  a  few  moments,  it 
can  rarely  be  omitted  without  disgrace. 

VII.— Its  Supports. 

1.  Artillery  must  always  be  protected  from 
the    melee,   in  which   it   is   helplea||   whether 
against  infantry  or  cavalry ;  and  should  there 
fore  have  a  strong  support. 

2.  A  portion,  at  least,  of  every  artillery  sup 
port,    should  consist  of  sharpshooters,  whose 
fire  will  be  the  most  effective  in  driving  off 


90    TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THREE  AKMS. 

skirmishers  sent  forward  to  threaten  or  attack 
the  guns,  or  to  pick  off  the  gunners. 

3.  Batteries  must  be  secured  on  ~botli  flanks, 
and  their  supports  will  be  posted  with  that 
view ;  on  one  or  on  both  flanks,  according  to 
circumstances,  and  more  or  less  retired. 

4.  A  support  should  never  be  directly  in 
rear  of  the  battery,  where  it  would  be  in  dan 
ger,  not  only  of  receiving  the  shots  aimed  at  the 
battery,  but  also  of  killing  the  gunners  belong 
ing  to  it,  as  has  repeatedly  happened  during  the' 
late  war. 

5.  A  battery  and  its  support  owe  each  other 
mutual  protection.    Therefore,  when  an  infantry 
support,  after  holding  the  enemy  in  check,  to 
enable  the  battery  to  limber  up  and  retire,  is 
obliged,    in    its    turn,    to    retreat,    the    battery 
should  take  such  a  position  as  will  enable  it  to 
cover  the  retreat  by  its  fire. 

6.  A  battery  consisting  of  any  considerable 
number  of  pieces  may  be  able,  sometimes,  to 
dispense  louJi  a  support. 

During  the  battle  of  Ucles,  in  Spain,  in  1809, 
the  French  artillery,  under  General  Senarmont, 
had  been  left  behind,  owing  to  the  badness  of 
the  roads.  The  Spaniards  came  down  upon  it 
in  large  force.  On  their  approach,  the  guns 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   ARTILLERY.  91 

were  formed  in  square,  and,  "by  tlieir  fire  on 
every  side,  defended  themselves  successfully, 
and  finally  repulsed  the  enemy. 

So,  at  Leipsic,  in  1813,  when  the  grand  bat 
tery  of  the  Guard,  which  had  Ibeen  left  tempo 
rarily  without  a  support,  was  charged  by  the 
Russian  hussars  and  Cossacks,  Drouot,  its  com 
mander,  rapidly  drew  back  its  flanks  till  they 
nearly  met ;  and  the  cavalry  were  soon  repulsed 
by  its  fire. 

7.  At  the  battle  of  Hanau,  in  1813,  Drouot' s 
eighty  guns  were  charged  by  the  Allied  cavalry. 
Having  no  supports,  he  placed  his  gunners  in 
front  of  them  with  their  carbines.  This  checked 
the  cavalry,  who  were  then  covered  with  grape, 
which  drove  them  back  to  their  lines. 

Ought  not  our  gunners  also  to  have  carbines 
slung  on  tlieir  backs  for  such  emergencies  ? 
Against  infantry,  our  guns  would  often  need  no 
other  support.  The  carbines  could  be  used  to 
reply  to  the  enemy' s  skirmishers ;  and  the  ex 
ample  just  cited  shows  that,  thus  equipped, 
artillerymen  may  sometimes  successfully  defend 
their  pieces  even  against  cavalry. 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  CAVALRY. 

We  shall  consider-^ 

L — ITS  FORMATIONS, 

II. — ITS  STRONG  AND  ITS  WEAK  POINTS. 
III. — How  IT  is  POSTED, 
IV. — ITS  SUPPORTS. 
V. — How  IT  is  USED. 
VI. — How  IT  FIGHTS. 
VII. — ITS  CHARGE. 
VIII. — ITS  ATTACK  ON  INFANTRY, 
And  shall  conclude  with  some— 
IX. — GENERAL  REMARKS. 

I.—Its  Formations. 

1.  The  formations  of  cavalry  for  battle  are 
either — 

(1.)  In  deployed  lines. 

(2.)  Lines  of  regiments,  in  columns  of  attack 
doubled  on  the  centre. 

(3.)  A  mixed  formation  of  lines  and  col 
umns. 


94    TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

(4.)  Echelons  of  lines  or  columns  ;  or— 
(5.)  Deep  columns. 

2.  Deployed  lines  are  not  objectionable  in 
principle.      They  are  often  not  advisable  ;  but 
are  sometimes  necessary. 

But  long,  continuous  lines  should  always  be 
avoided ;  being  unfavorable  to  rapid  manoeu 
vring,  which  cavalry  is  constantly  called  upon 
to  execute  in  the  field. 

3.  Cavalry  has,  in  its  horses,  an  unreasoning 
element,  which  is  not  controllable,  like  men  ; 
and  is  therefore  much  more  easily  thrown  into 
disorder  than  infantry.     For  this  reason,  when 
deployed,  it  should  always  be  in  two  lines  /  the 
second  behind  the  first ;  the  first  line  deployed, 
and  the  second  in  columns  of  squadrons  by 
platoons.     There  should  be  also  a  reserve  at  a 
few  hundred  paces  behind  the  second  line. 

The  second  line  should  be  near  enough  to 
the  first  to  be  able  to  support  it,  if  checked ; 
but  not  so  near  as  to  partake  in  its  disorder,  if 
repulsed. 

4.  Cavalry  should    be   always   in   column 
when  expecting  to  manoeuvre,  or  to  be  called 
on  to  make  any  rapid  movement ;  this  being  the 
formation  best  adapted  for  celerity. 

5.  Cavalry  deploys  in  lines — 


TACTICAL   USE   OF    CAVALKY.  95 

(1.)  When  preparing  for  a  charge  in  line. 

(2.)  When  preparing  for  any  attack  requi 
ring  the  utmost  possible  width  of  front ;  as 
where  the  enemy  is  to  be  suddenly  surrounded. 

(3.)  When  it  becomes  necessary  in  order  to 
prevent  our  troops  from  being  outflanked  by 
the  enemy's. 

(4.)  When  exposed  to  continued  artillery  lire, 
which  is  much  less  destructive  on  a  line  than  on 
a  column. 

6.  Cavalry  should  always  present  a  front  at 
least  equal  to  tlie  enemy''  s  /  otherwise,  its  flank, 
which  is  cavalry's  weak  point,  will  be  exposed 
to  attack.     When  inferior  in  numbers,  we  may 
extend  our  line  by  leaving  intervals,   more  or 
less  wide,    between  its   different   corps.      Any 
hostile    squadrons    that    may   attempt  to   pass 
through   these    intervals    to    take   the   line   in 
rear,   could  be 'taken  care   of   by  the 'second 
line. 

7.  The  best  formation  in  respect  to  mobility 
is  a  line  of  regiments  in  columns  by  squadrons, 
doubled  on  the   centre ;   corresponding  to  in 
fantry  double  columns. 

8.  The  mixed  formation  of  lines  and  columns 
is  more  manageable  than  simple  lines.     Which 
of  these  two  is  preferable  depends  upon  the 


96         TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

ground,  and  upon  all  the  other  circumstances  of 
the  case. 

9.  The  order  in  echelons  is  as  good  in  attack 
as  in  retreat ;  since  the  echelons  mutually  sup 
port  each  other. 

10.  Decidedly  the  most  objectionable  of  all 
cavalry  formations  is  that  in  deep  columns  : 

(1.)  From  the  almost  entire  loss  which  it  in 
volves  of  its  sabres,  which  are  cavalry's  pecu 
liar  and  most  effective  weapon. 

(2.)  From  the  long  flanks  which  it  exposes 
to  attack. 

11.  The  formation  in  one  rank,  instead  of 
two,  Jias  been  introduced  by  the  new  Cavalry 
Tactics,  though  it  has  been  as  yet  but  partially 
adopted  in  the  field. 

This  innovation  has  two-  advantages.  It 
doubles  the  number  of  sabres  to  be  used  against 
the  enemy  ;  and  it  enables  the  cavalry  to  cover 
double  the  ground ;  thus  doubling,  also,  its 
power  to  outflank,  which  is  a  valuable  advan 
tage,  especially  when  opposed  to  cavalry. 

Its  disadvantage  is,  that  it  must,  more  or  less 
seriously,  impair  the  solidity  and  vigor  of  the 
cavalry  charge  proper ;  in  which  a  whole  line, 
with  "boot  to  boot"  compactness,  comes  at  once 
to  the  shock,  like  some  terrific  mechanical  en- 


TACTICAL   USE  OF  CAVALRY.  97 

gine  ;  and  in  which  the  riders  in  the  front  rank 
are  compelled  to  dash  on  with  full  speed  to  the 
last ;  knowing  that  if  they  slacken  rein,  even 
for  a  moment,  they  would  be  ridden  over  by 
the  rear-rank  men  one  yard  behind  them.  From 
there  being  no  rear-rank  to  fill  up  the  gaps 
caused,  during  the  charge,  by  the  enemy's  mis 
siles,  or  by  casualties  occasioned  by  obstacles  of 
the  ground,  the  charging  line  must  generally 
arrive  on  the  enemy  broken  and  disunited,  or  as 
foragers.  The  moral  effect  of  such  a  charge  on 
our  own  men  will  be  unfavorable,  as  they  will 
not  realize  the  certainty  of  mutual  support  at 
the  critical  moment ;  and  its  moral  effect  on  the 
enemy  must  be  decidedly  inferior  to  that  pro 
duced  by  a  charge  that  is  at  once  swift,  solid, 
and  compact. 

But  the  force  of  this  objection  is  somewhat 
weakened,  by  the  consideration  that  the  com 
pact  charge  of  "  cavalry  of  the  line"  must  here 
after  be  comparatively  rare,  in  consequence  of 
the  introduction  of  rifled  artillery  and  infantry 
weapons,  with  their  greatly  increased  accuracy 
and  range ;  which  ought  to  cause  such  slaughter 
in  a  line  or  column  of  charging  cavalry,  that,  if 
it  arrive  at  all  to  the  shock,  it  would  generally 
be  only  in  scattered  groups. 
5 


98        TACTICAL   USE  OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

12.  In  advancing  over  wooded,  or  other  ob 
structed  ground,  it  may  be  necessary  to  break 
the  line  into  company  columns  of  fours,  as  in 
the  infantry  manoeuvre  of  advancing  by  the 
flanks  of  companies. 

As  the  cavalry  column  of  fours  corresponds 
to  the  march  of  infantry  by  the  flank,  the  use  of 
this  formation  in  action  is  open  to  the  same  ob 
jections  that  have  been  already  pointed  out  as 
applying  to  flank  marches  by  infantry, 

II.— If*  Strong:  and  Its  Weak  Points, 

1.  The  value  of  cavalry  on  the  battle-field 
consists  chiefly  in  its  velocity  and  mobility.    Its 
strength  is  in  the  sabre-point  and  spurs. 

2.  Its  charge  is  accompanied  with  a  power 
ful  moral  effect,  especially  upon  inexperienced 

troops.      But, 

3.  Cavalry  has  but  little  solidity,  and  can 
not  defend  a  position  against  good   infantry. 
For,  if  it  remain  passive  on  the  ground  it  is  to 
hold,  the  infantry  will  soon  destroy  it  by  its 
fire,  to  which  it  cannot,  with  any  effect,  reply ; 
and  if  it  attack  at  close  quarters,  the  infantry, 
by  means  of  its  defensive  formations,  will  be 
able,  at  least,  to  hold  its  ground,  and  probably 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  CAVALRY.  99 

repulse  its  charges  by  a  reserved  fire.  So  that 
the  cavalry  will  finally  have  no  alternative  but 
to  retire. 

4.  It   is    exposed    and    helpless   during  a 
change  of  formation;  like  artillery  limbering 
up,  or  coming  into  action. 

5.  On  its  flanks,  it  is  the  weakest  of  all 
arms.     A  single  squadron  attacking  it  suddenly 
in  flank,  will  break  and  rout  cavalry  of  ten 
times  its  number. 

At  the  battle  of  the  Pyramids,  Napoleon 
kept  a  few  squadrons  in  rear  of  either  flank, 
which,  on  his  line  being  charged  by  a  formida 
ble  body  of  Mamelukes,  vastly  superior  to  his 
own  cavalry  in  numbers,  horses,  and  equip 
ments,  nevertheless  suddenly  fell  on  their 
flanks  and  destroyed  them. 

6.  CaValry  is  never  so  weak  as  directly  after 
a  successful  charge;  being  then  exhausted,  and 
in  more  or  less  disorder. 


III.— How  Posted. 

1.  A  part  of  our  cavalry  must  be  so  posted 
as  to  secure  our  flanks ;  remaining  in  column 
behind  the  wings,  till  the  enemy's  movements 
require  its  deployment. 


100       TACTICAL  USE  OP  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

If  one  wing  is  covered  Iby  natural  obstacles, 
give  the  cavalry  to  the  uncovered  wing ;  post 
ing  it  in  rear  of  the  flank  battalion  of  the  second 
line. 

2.  When  cavalry  is  posted  on  the  flanks,  it 
should  not  usually  be  on  tlie  first  line  of  infan 
try.     If  it  is  to  be  used  for  attack,  it  is  better  to 
keep  it  retired  from  view  till  the  last  moment,  in 
order  to  strengthen  its  attack  by  the  powerful 
moral  effect  of  a  surprise.    And,  used  defensive 
ly,  it  will  be  best  posted  on  the  flanks  of  the 
second  line;   since,  in  advancing  to  charge,  it 
must  have  a  clear  space  in  its  front  of  at  least 
two  hundred  or  three  hundred  yards,  to  enable 
it  to  act  with  freedom  and  vigor. 

3.  But  if  a  position  can  be  found  for  cavalry 
in  front,  where  it  would  not  be  too  much  ex 
posed,  this  may  sometimes  enable  it  to  exercise 
an  important  moral  effect,  by  threatening  the 
flank  of  such  of  the  enemy's  troops  as  may  be 

sent  forward  to  attack. 

At  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  in  1813,  the  Wur- 
temburg  cavalry  was  launched  against  Blucher's 
Prussian  cavalry.  But,  seeing  the  Prussians 
drawn  up  not  only  in  front,  but  opposite  their 
flank,  they  lost  confidence,  charged  feebly,  and 
too  late.  They  were  consequently  repulsed 


TACTICAL  USE  07'  OAYALIftr:  !()! 


and  driven  back  on  the  Marine  Battalion,  which 
they  threw  into  confusion. 

So,  at  the  battle  of  Prairie  Grove,  in  Decem 
ber,  1862,  the  First  Iowa  Cavalry,  which  was 
held  in  reserve,  by  its  mere  presence,  caused 
every  attempt  of  the  rebels'  flanking  regiments 
to  be  abandoned. 

4.  In  order  not  to  impede  the  manoauvres  of 
the  infantry,  cavalry  should  not  fill  intervals  in 
the  lines,  or  be  placed  between  the  lines. 

It  is  dangerous  when  the  ground  is  such  as 
to  require  the  cavalry  in  the  centre  of  the  first 
line;  for,  if  it  is  beaten,  a  gap  is  left  through 
which  the  enemy  may  penetrate.  At  the  battle 
of  Blenheim,  in  1704,  Marlborough  owed  his 
victory,  in  great  measure,  to  the  Allies'  forcing 
back  the  cavalry  forming  the  centre  of  the 
French  army;  thus  turning  the  whole  of  its 
right  wing,  and  compelling  the  infantry  posted 
at  Blenheim  to  surrender. 

5.  Yet  cavalry  should  always  be  near  enough 
to  the  infantry  to  take  immediate  part  in  the 
combat  ;  and  although  it  should  not  be  posted 
in  the  intervals  between  infantry  corps,  it  may 
debouch  through  them,  in  order  to  attack  more 
promptly. 

At  the  battle  of  Friedland,  the  Russian  cav- 


102       TACTICAL   USE   GJ?  THE  THKEE  ARMS. 

airy  charged  a  French  infantry  division.  Latour 
Maubourg'  s  dragoons  and  the  Dutch  cuirassiers, 
riding  through  the  "battalion  intervals,  charged 
the  Russians  in  turn,  and  drove  them  "back  on 
their  infantry,  throwing  many  of  them  into  the 
river. 

6.  When  both  wings  are  uncovered,  the  "best 
place  for  the  cavalry  will  usually  be  in  rear  of 
the  centre  of  the  second  line ;  whence  it  can  be 
sent  in  the  shortest  time  to  either  wing. 

7.  Cavalry  should  not  be  scattered  over  tlie 
field  in  small  detachments,  but  be  kept  massed 
at  one  or  more  suitable  points ;   as  behind  the 
centre,  or  behind  one  wing,  or  both  wings.     A 
small  cavalry  force  should  be  kept  entire  ;  or  it 
will  have  very  little  chance  of  effecting  any 
thing  whatever. 

Cavalry  of  the  line,  to  produce  its  decisive 
effects,  must  be  used  in  heavy  masses.  In  the 
beginning  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  the  French 
cavalry  was  distributed  among  the  divisions. 
Napoleon's  subsequent  experience  led  him  to 
give  it  more  concentration,  by  uniting  in  one 
mass  all  the  cavalry  belonging  to  each  army 
corps ;  and,  finally,  these  masses  were  again 
concentrated  into  independent  cavalry  corps ; 
leaving  to  each  army  corps  only  cavalry  enough 
to  guard  it. 


TACTICAL  USE   OF  CAVALRY.  103 

8.  For  tactical  operations  in  the  field,  cav 
alry  insufficient  in  number  is  scarcely  better 
than  none  at  all,  as  it  can  never  show  itself  in 
presence  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which  would 
immediately  outflank  and  destroy  it,  and  must 
keep  close  behind  its  infantry. 

At  the  opening  of  Napoleon's  campaign  of 
1813,  he  had  but  very  little  cavalry  to  oppose 
to  the  overwhelming  masses  of  this  arm  pos 
sessed  by  the  Allies.  In  consequence  of  this, 
he  could  make  no  use  of  it  whatever ;  and  the 
tactical  results  of  the  battles  of  Lutzen  and 
Bautzen  were  far  inferior  to  those  habitually 
obtained  in  his  former  victories,  and  were  pur 
chased  with  much  greater  loss. 

9.  Small  bodies  of  cavalry  threatened  by  the 
enemy's  cavalry  in  greatly  superior  force,  may 
sometimes  be  saved  by  taking  refuge  in  an  in 
fantry  square,  as  practised  by  Napoleon  at  the 

battle  of  the  Pyramids. 

10.  Cavalry  should  remain  masked  as  long 
as  possible  ;  for  it  produces  most  effect  when  its 
position  and  movements  are  hidden,  so  that  a 
strong  force  may  suddenly  be  brought  upon  a 
weak  point. 

For  this  reason,  a  flat,  open  country  is  less 
favorable  for  this  arm  than  plains  with  tm<Jula- 


104       TACTICAL   USE  OF  THE  THEEE  AEMS. 

tions,  Mils  with  gentle  slopes,  woods,  villages, 
and  farms  ;  all  these  being  so  many  facilities  for 
screening  cavalry  from  view. 

11.  Cavalry  should  never  be  brought  to  the 
front,  except  to  engage.     It  is  unfortunate  when 
the  ground  is  such  as  to  prevent  this ;  for  cav 
alry,  compelled  to  remain  inactive  under  fire, 
is  in  great  danger  of  becoming  demoralized. 

12.  As  to  the  ground : 

(1.)  Cavalry  must  not  rest  its  flank  on  a  wood, 
a  village,  or  other  cover  for  an  enemy,  till  it  has 
been  occupied  by  our  own  troops.  If  com 
pelled  to  do  so,  it  should  send  out  patrols  to 
reconnoitre  and  observe.  Its  position  is  no 
longer  tenable  from  the  moment  the  enemy  ap 
pears  within  striking  distance  on  its  flank. 

(2.)  It  must  not  be  posted  on  the  very  ground 
it  is  to  defend,  but  in  rear  of  it ;  as  it  acts  effec 
tively  only  by  its  charge. 

Attacking  cavalry  must  have  favorable 
ground  in  front ;  defending  cavalry,  in  rear. 
An  obstacle  in  either  case  may  be  fatal. 

IV.— It§  Supports 

1.  The  flanks  of  cavalry  lines  or  columns  are 
always  exposed.  They  should,  therefore,  be 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  CAVALRY.  105 

protected  by  supports  of  light  cavalry,  which 
can  act  promptly  and  swiftly.  When  behind  a 
line,  these  supports  should  be  usually  in  open 
column,  so  as  to  be  able  to  wheel,  without  a 
moment's  delay,  into  line. 

2.  The  most  effectual  mode  of  protecting  the 
flank  of  a  line  or  column  of  cavalry  is  by  means 
of  squadrons  in  rear,  formed  in  echelons  extend 
ing  outwards  ;  as  this  exposes  the  enemy's  cav 
alry  that  may  attempt  to  charge  the  main  body 
in  flank  to  be  immediately  charged  in  flank 
themselves ;  which  would  be  destruction.     For 
this  purpose,  irregular  cavalry  may  be  as  effec 
tive  as  any  other. 

3.  This  cavalry  support  or  reserve  behind 
the  flanks  may  sometimes  play  an  important 
offensive  part.     The  enemy's  first  line,  the  in 
stant  after  either  making  or  receiving  a  charge, 
is  always  in  greater  or  less  disorder ;  and  a  vig 
orous  charge  then  made  on  it  in  flank  by  our 
own  flank  reserve,  would  have  a  decisive  effect. 

4.  Cavalry  should  never  engage  without  a 
support  or  reserve  in  rear,  not  only  to  guard  its 
flanks,  but  also  to  support  it  when  disorganized 
by  a  successful  charge. 

5.  So,  when  engaged  in  skirmishing  order ', 
being  then  very  much  exposed,  it  must  always 


106   TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THEEE  ARMS. 

be  protected,  like  infantry  skirmishers,  by  sup 
ports  in  close  order. 

6.  It  has  been  already  seen  that,  although 
cavalry  may  carry  a  position,  it  cannot  hold  it, 
if  attacked  by  infantry.  When  used  for  such  a 
purpose,  therefore,  it  should  always  be  accom 
panied  by  an  infantry  support. 

The  French  cavalry  succeeded  in  carrying 
the  plateau  of  Quatre  Bras ;  but,  having  no  in 
fantry  with  it  to  reply  to  the  terrible  fire  of  the 
Allied  infantry  from  the  surrounding  houses,  it 
was  compelled  to  retire,  and  yield  it  again  to 
the  enemy. 

According  to  Wellington,  Napoleon  frequent 
ly  used  his  cavalry  in  seizing  positions,  which 
were  then  immediately  occupied  by  infantry  or 
artillery. 

V.— How  lJ§ed. 

1.  Cavalry  generally  manoeuvres  at  a  trot. 
At  a  gallop,  disorder  is  apt  to  take  place,  and 
exhaustion  of  strength  that  will  be  needed  in 
the  charge. 

2.  The  ordinary  use  of  cavalry  is  to  follow 
-up  infantry  attacks  and  complete  their  success. 

It  should  never  be  sent  against  fresh  infantry; 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   CAVALRY.  107 

and  should  generally,  therefore,  Ibe  reserved  un 
til  towards  the  last  of  the  action. 

Napoleon,  who,  by  concentrating  his  cavalry 
into  considerable  masses,  had  enabled  himself  to 
use  it  on  the  battle-field  as  a  principal  arm, 
sometimes  produced  great  effects  by  heavy  cav 
alry  charges  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  action. 

But,  though  Napoleon's  splendidly  trained 
heavy  cavalry  might  sometimes  break  a  well- 
disciplined  infantry  without  any  preparatory 
artillery  fire,  it  would  be  dangerous  to  attempt 
this  with  cavalry  inferior  to  it  in  solidity ;  and 
the  new  rifled  weapons  would  seem  to  render 
the  cavalry  charges  of  his  day  no  longer  practi 
cable. 

3.  Cavalry  may  be  hurled  against  the  ene 
my's  infantry— 

(I.)  When  it  has  been  a  long  time  engaged, 
and  therefore  exhausted. 

(2.)  When  it  has  been  shattered  by  artil 
lery. 

And  always  should  be — 

(1.)  When  it  is  manoeuvring. 

(2.)  When  the  attack  would  be  a  surprise. 

(3.)  When  its  ranks  begin  to  waver,  or  when 
it  manifests  any  unequivocal  symptom  of  hesita 
tion  or  intimidation. 


108   TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THEEE  ARMS. 

In  the  three  latter  cases,  success  will  usually 
be  certain  ;  in  the  two  former  ones,  quite  proba 
ble  :  but,  in  most  other  cases,  a  cavalry  charge 
will  succeed,  perhaps,  only  one  time  in  ten. 

4.  The  chief  duties  of  cavalry  in  a  defensive 
battle  are — 

(1.)  To  watch  the  enemy's  cavalry,  to  pre 
vent  its  surprising  our  infantry. 

(2.)  To  guard  our  troops  from  being  out 
flanked. 

(3.)  To  defend  our  infantry  and  artillery 
while  manoeuvring. 

(4.)  To  be  ready  to  charge  the  enemy  the  in 
stant  his  attack  on  our  troops  is  repulsed. 

5.  Used  offensively,   it  must  promptly  at 
tack — 

(1.)  The  enemy's  flanks,  if  uncovered. 

(2.)  His  infantry,  when,  from  any  cause,  its 
attack  would  probably  succeed. 

(3.)  All  detachments  thrown  forward  with 
out  support. 

6.  When  cavalry  has  routed  cavalry,   the 
victorious  squadrons  should  at  once  charge  in 
flank  the  infantry  protected  ~by  tlie  cavalry  just 
~b eaten.     The  .great  Contie,  when  only  twenty- 
two  years  of  age,  by  this  means,  won  the  vic 
tory  of  Rocroi. 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  CAVALRY.  109 

7.  Deployed  as  skirmishers,  by  their  noise, 
dust,  and  smoke,  cavalry  may  furnish  a  good 
screen  for  our  movements. 

8.  Cavalry  skirmishers   scout   their   corps, 
to    prevent    the    enemy    reconnoitring    it    too 
closely. 

9.  When  a  cavalry  rear-guard  has  to  defend, 
temporarily,  a  defile,  a  bridge,  or  a  barricade, 
a  part  should  dismount,  and  use  their  carbines 
till  the  rest  are  safe. 

So,  a  cavalry  vanguard,  by  its  fire,  dis 
mounted,  may  prevent  the  enemy  from  destroy 
ing  a  bridge. 

In  these,  and  in  similar  cases,  the  cavalry 
men  should  habitually  dismount,  in  order  to 
render  their  fire  effective ;  acting  and  manoeu 
vring  as  skirmishers. 


V  I.— IIo\v  it  Fights. 

1.  The  success  of  cavalry  in  battle  depends 
on  the  impetuosity  of  its  charge,  and  its  use  of 
the  sabre.  When  deployed  as  skirmishers, 
mounted  or  dismounted,  its  proper  weapon  is 
the  carbine  or  pistol ;  and  in  individual  com 
bats,  these  weapons  may  occasionally  be  very 


110       TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE   ARMS. 

useful.*  But  when  acting  as  cavalry  proper,  in 
any  compact  formation,  it  must  rely  on  the 
sabre.  The  aim  with  &  pistol  or  carbine  in  the 
hands  of  a  mounted  man  is  so  unsteady,  that  the 
fire  of  a  line  of  cavalry  is  generally  ineffective  ; 
and  there  are  few  occasions  where  it  should 
be  resorted  to.  When  cavalry  has  learned  to 
realize  that  these  are  not  its  true  arms,  and  that 
it  is  never  really  formidable  but  when  it  closes 
with  the  enemy  at  full  speed  and  with  uplifted 
sabre,  it  has  acquired  the  most  important  ele 
ment  of  its  efficiency. 

2.  Cavalry  should,   therefore,   not  fight  in 
columns,  as  most  of  its  sabres  would  thereby 
become  useless.     But  if  a  facing  about  to  retreat 
is  feared,  an  attack  in  column  would  prevent  it. 
It  is  said,  also,  that  a  column  is  more  imposing 
than  a  line.     If  so,  it  might  have  a  greater  moral 
effect  on  the  enemy. 

3.  When  cavalry  are  deployed  as  skirmish 
ers,  as  a  curtain  to  hide  our  movements,  they 
should  be  in  considerable  number,  with  small 
intervals,  and  should  make  as  much  noise,  and 
smoke,  and  dust  as  possible.    When  the  charge 
is  sounded,  the  skirmishers  wait  and  fall  in  with 
the  rest. 

4.  The  great  rule  in  cavalry  combats  is  to 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   CAVALRY.  Ill 

cover  our  own  flanks -,  and  gain  the  enemy*  s  / 
for  these  are  his  and  our  weakest  points. 

5.  When  the  enemy's  cavalry  is  already  in 
full  charge  on  our  infantry,  it  is  too  late  for  our 
cavalry  to  charge  it  with  much  prospect  of  suc 
cess.     In  such  a  case,  it  would  "be  better  to  de 
fer  our  own  charge  till  the  moment  that  the 
enemy's  is  completed;    for  our  success    then 
would  be  certain. 

6.  Cavalry  attacks  cavalry  in  line,  in  order 
to  have  the  more  sabres,  and,  if  possible,  to  out 
flank  the  enemy. 

7.  If  we  can  manoeuvre  so  as  to  attack  the 
enemy's  cavalry  in  flank ',  our  success  will  be 
certain. 

Military  history  affords  hundreds  of  instances 
in  proof  of  this  proposition.  At  one  of  the  bat 
tles  in  Spain,  for  example,  in  1809,  fifteen  hun 
dred  French  horse,  by  charging  four  thousand 
Spanish  cavalry  in  flank,  completely  cut  it  in 
pieces. 

8.  Cavalry  never  waits  in  position  to  be 
charged  by  cavalry.     Its  only  safety  is  in  meet 
ing  the  charge  with  a  violent  gallop  ;  it  would 
otherwise  be  sure  to  be  overthrown. 

When  hostile  cavalries  thus  meet  each  other, 
there  is  usually  but  small  loss  on  either  side. 


112       TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THEEE  AKMS. 

A  certain  number  of  troopers  are  usually  dis 
mounted  ;  Ibut  the  colliding  masses  somehow 
ride  through  each  other,  allowing  but  little  time 
for  the  exchange  of  points  and  cuts. 

Thus  cavalry  can  defend  itself  against  cav 
alry  only  by  attacking ;  which  it  must  do  even 
when  inferior  to  the  enemy  in  number. 

9.  To  attack  artillery,  cavalry  should  be  in 
three  detachments  /  one-fourth  to  seize  the  guns  ; 
one-half  to  charge  the  supports ;  and  the  other 
fourth  as  a  reserve. 

The  first  party  attacks  in  dispersed  order,  as 
foragers,  trying  to  gain  the  flanks  of  the  battery. 
The  second  party  should  manoeuvre  to  gain  the 
flanks  of  the  supports. 

10.  Where  a  cavalry  attack  can  be  masked, 
so  as  to  operate  as  a  surprise,  a  battery  may  be 
taken  by  charging  it  in  front.     The  formidable 
Spanish  battery  in  the  Pass  of  Somosierra,  was 
finally  carried  by  a  dash  of  Napoleon's  Polish 
Lancers  upon  it,  suddenly  profiting  of  a  tem 
porary  fog  or  mist.     But,   in  ordinary  cases, 
when  cavalry  has  to  charge  a  battery  in  front, 
its  fire  should  be  drawn  by  our  own  guns  or  in 
fantry,  immediately  before  the  charge  begins. 

11.  In  an  attack  on  an  intrenchment,  the 
office  of  cavalry  can  rarely  be  any  thing  else 


TACTICAL  USE  OF  CAVALEY.  113 

than  to  repulse  sorties  from  the  work,  and  to 
cut  off  the  enemy's  retreat  from  it. 


VII.— Its  Charge. 

1.  As  cavalry  acts  effectively  on  the  field  of 
battle  only  by  its  charge,  good  cavalry  of  the 
line  can  be  formed  in  no  other  way  than  by 
being  exercised  in  this,  its  special  and  peculiar 
function. 

On  taking  command  of  the  Army  of  Italy  in 
1796,  Bonaparte  found  the  French  cavalry  to  be 
entirely  worthless.  They  had  never  been  ac 
customed  to  charge,  and  he  had  the  greatest 
difficulty  in  making  them  engage.  Seeing  the 
great  importance  of  this  arm,  he  determined  to 
make  good  cavalry  of  them  by  compelling  them 
to  fight.  So,  in  his  attack  on  Borghetto,  he  sent 
his  cavalry  forward,  with  his  grenadiers  on 
their  flanks,  and  his  artillery  close  behind  them. 
Thus  enclosed,  and  led  on  by  Murat  to  the 
charge,  they  attacked  and  routed  that  famous 
Austrian  cavalry  whose  superiority  they  had  so 
much  dreaded.  This  was  the  first  step  in  the 
formation  of  the  splendid  French  cavalry  to 
which  Napoleon  afterwards  owed  so  many  of 
his  victories.  And,  at  the  battle  of  Hochstedt, 


114       TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  AEMS. 

on  the  Danube,  in  1801,  its  superiority  over  the 
Austrian  cavalry  was,  at  last,  completely  estab 
lished. 

2.  Cavalry  charges— 

(1.)  In  line ;  but  this  only  on  even  ground, 
and  at  short  distances ; 

(2.)  In  column  ;  and 

(3.)  As  foragers,  or  in  dispersed  order.  But 
this  kind  of  charge  is  exceptional.  It  can  rarely 
be  used  with  safety  against  any  but  an  uncivil 
ized  or  an  undisciplined  foe, 

3.  A  charge   in   one  long  continuous  line 
should  never  be  attempted.     Such  a  charge  will 
be  usually  indecisive,  as  it  cannot  be  made  with 
the  necessary  ensemble  or  unity.     The  success 
of  a  charge  in  line  depends  on  the  preservation 
of  a  well-regulated  speed  and  of  a  perfect  align 
ment  ;  by  means  of  which  the  whole  line  reaches 
the  enemy  at  once.     At  the  charging  gait,  this 
is  rarely  attainable ;  so  that  the  charge  in  line, 
except  at  short  distances,  and  over  very  even 
ground,  usually  degenerates  into  a  charge  by 
groups,   or   individual   troopers,  arriving   suc 
cessively.      The  most  dashing  riders,  or  those 
mounted  on  the  swiftest  horses,  will  naturally 
arrive  first,  and  be  overpowered  by  numbers. 

4.  A  charge  in  deep  column  is  also  objec- 


TACTICAL   USE   OF  CAVALRY.  115 

tionable  ;  its  long  flank  exposing  it  too  much 
to  artillery  fire  and  to  the  enemy's  cavalry. 

But  when  cavalry  is  surprised,  it  must  charge 
at  once,  in  whatever  order  it  happens  to  be 
rather  than  hesitate  or  attempt  to  manoeuvre,  for 
this  would  expose  it  to  destruction. 

5.  A  prompt  and  unhesitating  obedience  to 
the  command  to  charge,  without  regard  to  the 
circumstances  under  which  it  is  given,  may 
sometimes  ]ead  to  results  unexpected  even  to  the 
charging  troops  themselves. 
i  One  instance  of  this  was  related  to  me  by  an 
old  officer  of  Napoleon's  favorite  Fifth  Cuiras 
siers.  The  regiment  was  on  the  left  of  the  line 
of  battle.  Directly  in  front  of  it  was  an  exten 
sive  marsh ;  beyond  which  rose  an  eminence, 
abrupt  in  front,  but  sloping  gently  towards  the 
rear,  the  crest  of  which  was  crowned  by  formi 
dable  Austrian  batteries.  For  two  hours  the 
cuirassiers  had  been  standing  in  line,  listening 
to  the  roar  of  battle  on  the  right,  and  eagerly 
expecting  a  summons  to  go  somewhere  to  en 
gage  the  enemy.  The  very  horses  wer%  neighing 
and  pawing  the  ground,  in  their  impatience  to 
be  off.  Just  then  galloped  up  one  of  the  Em 
peror's  aids,  saying,  "Colonel,  the  Emperor 
desires  you  to  charge  directly  on  the  enemy's 


110       TACTICAL  USE  OP  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

batteries  opposite  your  position."  The  brave 
colonel,  who  was  one  of  Napoleon's  personal 
favorites,  though  chafing  at  the  prolonged  inac 
tion  of  his  command,  pointed  to  the  marsh,  and 
requested  the  officer  to  inform  the  Emperor  of 
the  obstacle  in  his  front,  with  the  existence  of 
which  his  majesty,  he  said,  was  probably  un 
acquainted.  In  a  few  minutes  the  officer  came 
riding  furiously  back  with  a  message  to  the 
colonel,  that  "if  he  did  not  immediately  charge, 
the  Emperor  would  come  and  lead  the  regiment 
himself."  Stung  by  this  reproof,  the  colonel 
plunged  his  spurs  into  his  horse's  flanks,  and 
giving  the  command  "  Forward,"  led  his  regi 
ment,  at  full  gallop,  directly  through  the  marsh 
upon  the  point  that  had  been  indicated. 

The  charge  itself  was,  of  course,  a  failure. 
The  regiment  finally  struggled  its  way  through 
the  marsh  to  the  opposite  side,  but  leaving 
behind  it  a  large  number  of  gallant  officers  and 
men,  who  had  sunk  to  rise  no  more  ;  my  in 
formant  being  of  the  number  who  escaped. 

But  the  result  of  this  demonstration  was 
most  decisive.  Seeing  that  the  height  on  which 
the  Austrians  had  planted  their  heavy  batteries, 
and  which  commanded  the  entire  ground,  was 
the  key  of  the  battle,  Napoleon  had  determined 


TACTICAL  USE   OF   CAVALRY.  117 

to  wrest  it  from  them,  together  with  the  batter 
ies  which  crowned  it.  Accordingly,  the  even 
ing  before,  he  had  dispatched  a  body  of  light 
infantry  by  a  very  circuitous  route,  to  turn  the 
position  and  attack  the  batteries  in  rear.  He 
had  accurately  calculated  the  time  the  detach 
ment  would  require  to  reach  its  destination ; 
and  when  the  moment  arrived  at  which  it  should 
be  ready  to  commence  its  attack,  he  ordered  the 
cuirassiers  to  charge  directly  upon  the  position 
in  front.  The  Austrian  artillery,  suddenly  at 
tacked  in  rear,  and,  at  the  same  time,  threatened 
with  a  cavalry  charge  in  front,  where  it  had 
deemed  itself  perfectly  secure,  tried  to  change 
the  position  of  its  pieces,  so  as  to  get  a  fire  on 
its  assailants  from  both  directions.  But  it  was 
too  late  ;  the  temporary  confusion  into  which  it 
was  thrown  enabled  the  French  infantry  to 
carry  all  before  it,  and  the  height  was  won, 
with  all  its  batteries. 

So,  at  Waterloo,  Sir  Hussey  Vivian's  brigade 
of  Light  Cavalry,  which  was  marching  in  column 
by  half  squadrons,  left  in  front,  had  begun  to 
form  up  into  line  on  the  leading  half  squadron, 
when  an  order  arrived  from  Wellington  to 
charge.  Instantly  the  charge  was  made,  and, 
of  course,  in  echelons  of  half  squadrons,  ex- 


118       TACTICAL   USE  OF  THE  THEEE  AEMS. 

tending  to  the  right.  The  effect  of  this  was  that 
a  body  of  French  cavalry  on  its  right,  then  at 
tacking  the  British  line,  was  suddenly  taken  in 
flank  and  completely  routed. 

6.  A  charge  in  deep  column  may  sometimes 
"be  made  necessary  by  the  nature  of  the  ground, 
which,  at  the  same  time,  protects  its  long  flanks : 
as  where,  in  our  pursuit  of  the  rebels  after  the 
battle  of  Nashville,  in  1864,  the  Fourth  United 
States  Cavalry,  approaching  them  over  a  nar 
row  turnpike,  made  a  vigorous  charge  in  col 
umn  of  fours,  which  broke  their  centre,  and, 
with  the  help  of  infantry  skirmishers  on  the 
flanks,  drove  them  from  the  ground. 

7.  When  the  ground  is  rugged,  in  order  to 
lessen  the  number  of  falls,  the  rear-rank,  in  the 
charge,  should  open  out  six  paces,  closing  up 
again  at  the  last  moment. 

8.  Cavalry  advances  to  charge  at  a  trot,  or  at 
a  gallop.     A  fast  trot  is  better  than  a  gallop,  as 
alignments  are  not  easily  kept  at  great  speed. 
Experience  has  shown  that  the  best  distance 
from  the  enemy  to  begin  the  gallop,  is  about 
two  hundred  and  sixty  yards ;  thence  steadily 
increasing  to  the  maximum  of  speed.    This  grad 
ual  increase  of  speed  is  very  important,  to  pre 
vent  the  horses  from  being  completely  blown  on 
reaching  the  enemy. 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   CAVALRY.  119 

9.  Cavalry  should  not  charge  by  a  wood,  till 
it  has  Ibeen  carried  by  our  own  infantry,  if  it  can 
possibly  be  avoided. 

At  the  battle  of  Kollin,  in  1756,  Frederick's 
cavalry,  pursuing  the  Austrians,  was  taken  in 
flank  by  some  Austrian  infantry  posted  in  a 
wood,  and  made  to  retire  with  great  loss. 

10.  When  cavalry  is  required  to  charge  over 
unknown  ground,  it  should  be  preceded  by  a 
few  men  thrown  out  to  the  front  as  skirmishers, 
in  order  to  scout  the  ground  to  be  passed  over. 
The  neglect  of  this  precaution  has  sometimes  led 
to  great  disaster. 

At  Talavera,  two  cavalry  regiments,  the  First 
German  Hussars  and  the  Twenty-third  Light 
Dragoons,  were  ordered  to  charge  the  head  of 
some  French  infantry  columns.  When  near  the 
top  of  their  speed  they  came  suddenly  upon  a 
deep  ravine,  with  steep  sides.  Colonel  Arent- 
schild,  commanding  the  Hussars,  who  was  in 
front,  at  once  reined  Up,  and  halted  his  regi 
ment,  saying :  "  I  vill  not  kill  my  young 
mensch  !"  But  the  other  regiment,  commanded 
by  Colonel  Seymour,  which  was  on  its  left,  not 
seeing  the  obstacle  in  time,  plunged  down  it, 
men  and  horses  rolling  over  on  each  other  in 
frightful  confusion.  Of  the  survivors,  who  ar- 


120       TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

rived  on  the  other  side  by  twos  and  threes, 
many  were  killed  or  taken ;  and  only  one-half 
of  the  regiment  ever  returned. 

So,  at  the  battle  of  Courtrai,  in  1302,  from 
the  French  cavalry's  omitting  to  scout  the 
ground  they  charged  over,  the  Flemings  won  a 
great  victory.  All  the  elite  of  the  French  no 
bility  and  chivalry  was  destroyed,  and  gold 
spurs  were  collected  by  bushels  on  the  field.  It 
was  the  French  Cannae.  The  Flemings  were 
drawn  up  behind  a  canal,  flowing  between  high 
banks,  and  hidden  from  view.  The  French 
rushing  on  at  full  gallop,  all  the  leading  ranks 
were  plunged  into  the  canal.  The  entire  caval 
ry  was  thereby  checked  and  thrown  into  irre 
trievable  disorder,  which  extended  to  the  infan 
try,  in  their  rear.  The  Flemings,  profiting  by 
their  confusion,  crossed  the  canal  at  two  points 
simultaneously,  attacked  them  in  flank,  and 
completed  their  rout. 

So,  at  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  in  1813,  Murat, 
in  his  great  cavalry  charge  on  the  Allied  centre, 
had  captured  twenty-six  guns,  and  was  carrying 
all  before  him,  when  he  pushed  on  to  the  village 
of  Gulden  Grossa,  where  the  ground  had  not 
been  reconnoitred,  and  could  not  be  distinctly 
seen  from  a  distance.  Here  the  French  found 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   CAVALRY. 

their  career  suddenly  checked  by  a  great  hol 
low,  full  of  buildings,  pools  of  water,  and  clus 
ters  of  trees;  while  the  Allied  infantry,  from 
behind  the  various  covers  afforded  by  the 
ground,  opened  upon  them  a  destructive  fire. 
Being  "then  suddenly  charged  in  flank  by  the 
Russian  cavalry,  they  were  driven  back  with 
heavy  loss  ;  the  Allies  recapturing  twenty  of 
the  twenty-six  guns  they  had  lost. 

The  troopers  employed  to  scout  the  ground 
before  a  charge  would  not  be  in  much  danger 
from  the  enemy,  who  would  hardly  fire  on  a 
horseman  or  two,  especially  when  expecting  a 
charge. 

11.  Cavalry  must  never  pursue,  unless  its 
supports  are  close  at  hand. 

In  pursuing,  it  must  be  circumspect,  and  not 
go  too  far.     Union  and  order  are  indispensable  ; 
for,  without  them,  a  slight  resistance  may  suffice 
to  cause  a  repulse. 
6 


122      TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

VIII.— Its  Attack  011  Infantry. 

First,  as  to  its  ATTACK  GENERALLY. 
Secondly,  its  attack  ON  SQUARES. 

A.  GENERALLY. 

1.  Cavalry  must  avoid  distant  engagements 
with  infantry  ;  in  which  the  latter  must  always 
have  the  advantage. 

2.  The  slightest  cavalry  charge  on  the  flank 
of  infantry  will  rout  it. 

3.  As  to  a  cavalry  attack  in  front :   If  the 
infantry  stand  firm,  the  chances  are  against  its 
success.     If  the  infantry  cannot  "be  attacked  in 
flank,  the  cavalry  should  therefore  wait  till  it 
has  "been  shattered  by  artillery,  or  has  become 
exhausted,  or  demoralized,  or  till  it  begins  to 
manoeuvre. 

4.  If  the  infantry  be  in  line,  or  in  column, 
cavalry  should  attack  it  in  flank ;  if  in  square, 
at  one  of  its  angles ;  if  in  several  squares,  at  one 
of  its  flank  ones,  so  as  to  avoid  a  cross-tire  from 
the  other  squares.     If  a  flank  square  be  broken, 
the  next  one  to  it,  being  no  longer  protected  by 
the  fire  of  any  other  square,  may  be  attacked 
with  the  same  prospect  of  success ;  and  so  on 
successively. 


TACTICAL   USE   OP   CAVALRY.  123 

6.  But  if  the  hostile  infantry  have  support 
ing  cavalry,  we  must  not  charge  in  such  a  man 
ner  as  to  enable  it  to  take  us  in  flank. 

6.  To  test  the  infantry  about  to  be  attacked, 
cavalry  may  pass  a  few  hundred  paces  in  its 
front,   to  threaten  it,    sending   forward  a  few 
horsemen  to  fire,  gallop  forward,  and  raise  a 
dust.     If  the  infantry,  instead  of  disregarding 
these  movements,  begin  to  fife,  it  will  probably 
be  broken,  on  the  cavalry's  charging  it  at  once 
and  vigorously,  whether  in  column  or  in  line. 
But  otherwise,  if  the  infantry  reserve  its  fire, 
and  only  sends  out  a  few  sharpshooters. 

7.  Ascending  slopes,  if  not  too  steep,  are  not 
unfavorable  to  attacks  on  infantry;    for  their 
shots,  as  experience  shows,  will  then  mostly  fly 
too  high. 

8.  On  a  descending  slope,  cavalry  charges 
down  on  infantry  with  terrible  effect ;  as  it  then 
arrives  with  an  impetus  which  nothing  can  stop. 

At  Waterloo,  a  column  of  French  infantry 
was  ascending  a  steep  slope.  Suddenly  the 
Scotch  Greys  cavalry  regiment  dashed  down 
upon  it  from  above,  rode  over,  and  destroyed  it 


124      TACTICAL  USE   OF   THE  THREE  AEMS. 

B.  ON  SQUAEES. 

1.  Infantry  squares  are  usually  charged  in 
open  column;   the  distance  "between  the  sub 
divisions  Ibeing  a  subdivision  front  and  a  few 
yards  over  ;  in  order  that  each  subdivision  may 
have  time  to  break  into  the  square,  or,  if  unsuc 
cessful,  to  disengage  itself  and  retire. 

But  the  distances  should  never  be  so  great 
as  to  allow  the  square  to  reload  after  firing  a 
volley  at  the  next  preceding  subdivision. 

2.  The  leading  subdivision  will  usually  draw 
the  fire  of  the  square.      If  this  is  delivered  at 
very  short  range,  say  at  twenty  paces,  it  will 
raise  up  a  rampart  of  dead  and  wounded  men 
and  horses  which  will  probably  suffice  to  check 
the  following  subdivisions,  and  so  repulse  the 
charge.     But  an  infantry  square  rarely  reserves 
its.  fire  so  long ;  and  if  the  fire  is  delivered  at 
any  considerable  distance,  no  such  effect  will  be 
produced. 

3.  A  good  formation  to  attack  a  square  is 
said  to  be  a  column  of  three  squadrons,  with 
squadron  front,  at  double  distance  ;  followed  by 
a  fourth  squadron,  in  column  of  divisions  or 
platoons,   to  surround  the   square,   and  make 
prisoners,  if  it  is  broken, 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   CAVALKY.  125 

4.  Before  cavalry  charges  a  square,  it  should 
be  first  shattered  or  demoralized  by  artillery 
fire,  when  this  is  practicable.     In  the  absence 
of  artillery,  sharpshooting  infantry  skirmishers 
may,  to  a  certain  extent,  supply  its  place. 

5.  A  square  should  be  attacked  at  one  of  its 
angles,  which   are  obviously  its  weakest  and 
most  vulnerable  points.     But  to  cover  a  real 
attack  on  an  angle,  cavalry  sometimes  makes  a 
false  attack  on  the  front  of  a  square. 

6.  When  squares  are  formed  checkerwise, 
cavalry  must  attack  a  flank  square,  and  not  ex 
pose  itself  to  a  cross-fire  by  charging  an  interior 
one. 

7.  Cavalry  charging  a  square  firing  irregu 
larly  will    usually  break  it.      But  when    the 
square  reserves  its  fire,  and  pours  in  well-aimed 
volleys  at  short  range,  the  charge  will  rarely 
succeed.     The  cavalry  should,  therefore,  before 
charging,  use  every  effort  to  draw  the  fire  of  the 
square,  or  of  the  fronts  which  threaten  it.     This 
is  sometimes  accomplished  by  sending  forward 
a  few  skirmishers  to  fire  on  the  square. 

8.  When  one  square  fires  to  assist  another, 
the  firing  square  should  be  instantly  charged, 
before  it  has  time  to  reload. 

9.  To  succeed,  a  cavalry  charge  should  be 

6* 


126   TACTICAL  USE  OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

made  with  a  desperate,  forlorn-hope  reckless 
ness,  and  with  reiterated  attacks  on  one  point. 
If  the  fire  has  been  delivered  at  very  close 
range,  though  its  effect  has  probably  been  de 
structive,  the  smoke  will  momentarily  shut  out 
the  line  of  infantry  from  the  horses'  view,  thus 
removing  the  chief  obstacle  to  their  breaking 
through  it.  The  survivors  of  the  fire  should 
therefore  rush  desperately  on. 

If  the  French  attacks  on  the  British  squares 
at  Quatre  Bras  had  been  made  in  this  manner, 
instead  of  opening  to  the  right  and  left,  and 
diverging  to  a  flank  at  the  moment  of  closing, 
they  would  probably  have  succeeded. 

But  this  sudden  divergence  is  often  the  fault 
of  the  horses,  which  instinctively  recoil  before 
a  serried  line  of  infantry,  with  bayonets  at  the 
charge.  Cavalry  should,  therefore,  never  be 
practised  on  the  drill-ground  in  charging  a 
square,  as  the  horses  would  thereby  acquire  the 
habit  of  suddenly  checking  their  course,  or  of 
diverging  to  a  flank,  on  arriving  at  the  enemy. 
This  would  so  strengthen  their  natural  instinct 
that  they  could  never  be  got  to  break  a  square. 
"Or,  at  least,  when  this  manoeuvre  is  practised 
for  the  purpose  of  instruction,  the  horses  used 
should  never  afterwards  be  taken  into  the  field. 


TACTICAL   USE  OF  CAVALEY.  127 

10.  The  cavalry  most  formidable  to  an  in 
fantry  square  are  Lancers.     Their  lances,  which     / 
are  from  eleven  to  sixteen  feet  long,  easily  reach 
and  transfix  the  infantry  soldier,  while  the  sa 
bres  of  the  other  cavalry  are  too  short  to  reach 
him  over  the  horse's  neck,  and  over  the  musket, 
lengthened  by  the  bayonet.     But 'Lancers  are 
usually  no  match  against  other  cavalry,  who 
can  parry  and  ripost  before  the  lance  can  re 
sume  the  guard. 

11.  When  cavalry  has  succeeded  in  com 
pletely  breaking  a  body  of  infantry,  it  may 
often  inflict  fearful  slaughter  upon  them. 

At  the  battle  of  Rio  Seco,  in  Spain,  after 
Lasalle'  s  twelve  hundred  horse  had  broken  the 
Spanish  infantry,  they  galloped  at  will  among 
twenty-five  thousand  soldiers,  some  five  thou 
sand  of  whom  they  slew. 

IX. — General  Remarks. 

1.  Besides  its  uses  on  the  field  of  battle, 
cavalry  may  render  most  important  service  in 
completing  the  destruction  of  beaten  corps,  or 
compelling  their  surrender,  and  so  enable  us  to 
secure  the  great  strategic  objects  of  the  cam 
paign.  Thus,  after  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  it 


A 

128      TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  AEMS. 


the  Prussian  cavalry  that  completed  the 
\  dispersion  of  the  French  army,  and  prevented  it 
from  rallying.  And,  but  for  Napoleon's  ill 
fortune  in  respect  to  Grouchy,  in  that  battle,  he 
would,  to  all  appearance,  have  succeeded  in 
accomplishing  his  plan  of  campaign,  which  was, 
to  separate  the  English  from  the  Prussians,  beat 
them  in  detail,  and  complete  their  destruction 
with  his  twenty  thousand  cavalry. 

2.  The  battles  of  the  late  War  of  the  Kebel- 
lion,  the  earlier  ones,  at  least,  were  mostly  inde 
cisive.  One  chief  cause  of  this  was,  that  neither 
side  had  a  sufficient  force  of  true  cavalry  to  en 
able  it  to  complete  a  victory,  to  turn  a  defeat 
into  a  rout,  and  drive  the  enemy  effectually 
from  the  field.  The  cavalry  charges  were  gen 
erally  such  as  mounted  infantry  could  have  just 
as  well  made  ;  charges  in  which  the  pistol  and 
carbine  played  the  principal  part,  instead  of  the 
spur  -and  sabre.  It  was  not  until  the  fight  at 
Brandy  Station,  in  June,  1863,  that  sabres  were 
used,  to  any  extent,  at  close  quarters.  Thus, 
neither  of  the  contending  armies  was  able  to 
break  up  and  disperse,  destroy,  or  capture  its 
enemy's  infantry  masses,  in  the  manner  prac 
tised  in  Napoleon's  great  wars,  not  having,  to 
any  considerable  extent,  that  description  of 


TACTICAL    USE   OF   CAVALRY.  129 

force  called  Cavalry  of  the  Line,  which  alone  is 
capable  of  effecting  these  results  by  its  solid 
and  compact  formations,  its  skilful,  yet  rapid 
manoeuvring,  and  its  crashing  charges. 

3.  European  cavalry  of  the  line  is  divided 
into  Heavy  and  Light.     Heavy  cavalry  is  heavi 
ly  armed  ;  that  is,  their  weapons  are  larger  and 
heavier  than  those  of  light  cavalry,  and  to  these 
weapons,   carbines,  in  most  of  the   corps,   are 
added.     Some  of  the  corps  wear  steel  or  brass 
cuirasses ;   and  the  men  and  horses  are  of  the 
largest  size. 

In  Light  cavalry,  the  only  weapons  are  the 
sabre  and  pistol ;  and  the  men  and  horses  are 
light  and  active,  rather  than  strong  and  large. 

Lancers  are  considered  a  medium  between 
Heavy  and  Light  cavalry. 

4.  Great  as  may  be  the  advantages  of  a  large 
force  of  regular  cavalry  of  the  line,  there  were 
serious    objections  to  its  being  raised   at   the 
opening  of  the  late  war. 

(1.)  The  theatre  of  war  presented  nowhere 
any  of  those  wide  and  level  plains  so  common 
in  Europe,  and  on  which  cavalry  masses  are 
able  to  produce  such  decisive  effects  in  battle. 
On  the  contrary,  the  ground  was  almost  every 
where  so  rugged  and  mountainous,  or  else  so 


130      TACTICAL   USE   OF  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

densely  wooded,  as  to  be  extremely  unfavorable 
to  the  movements  of  cavalry  of  this  descrip 
tion. 

(2.)  Since  the  introduction  of  the  new  rifled 
arms,  exposing  cavalry  masses  to  a  deadly  fire 
at  far  greater  distances  than  ever  before  known, 
a  fire  often  reaching  to  the  reserves,  it  seemed 
doubtful  whether  the  manoeuvring  and  charging 
in  heavy,  compact  masses,  which  formerly  ren 
dered  cavalry  of  the  line  so  formidable,  would 
any  longer  be  practicable. 

(3.)  The  comparative  cost  of  this  kind  of 
force  is  so  great,  that,  if  it  had  been  raised  and 
kept  up  on  the  scale  required,  the  expense  of 
this  war,  enormous  as  it  has  been,  would  have 
been  vastly  augmented.  Three  years  are  re 
quired  for  the  thorough  training  and  instruction 
of  the  men  and  horses  ;  so  that  it  would  not 
have  been  until  the  fourth  year  of  the  war  that 
we  could  begin,  even,  to  reap  the  fruits  of  so 
enormous  an  outlay. 

5.  But  to  carry  on  any  war  successfully, 
what  is  needed,  and  is,  in  fact,  indispensable,  is 
an  ample  force  of  light  cavalry,  of  a  kind  requi 
ring  comparatively  but  little  time  and  training 
to  fit  it  for  the  various  and  important  duties 
devolving  upon  it  in  the  field,  and  therefore  far 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   CAVALEY.  131 

less  expensive  than  cavalry  of  the  line ;  and 
having  all  the  discipline  of  this  latter  kind  of 
force,  though  wanting  its  perfection  of  ma 
noeuvre.  Every  arrny,  or  considerable  detach 
ment,  must  have  enough  of  this  kind  of  force 
with  it  to  furnish  what  is  requisite  for  Outpost 
duty,  Patrols  offensive  and  defensive,  Escorts  to 
trains,  Foraging  parties,  Reconnoissances,  and 
the  various  other  purposes  necessarily  incidental 
to  operations  in  the  field  ;  and  in  marches,  all 
Advanced,  Rear,  and  Flank  guards  should  con 
sist,  in  part,  at  least,  of  cavalry.  Finally,  this  de 
scription  of  force  is  needed  for  the  performance 
of  those  arduous,  but  most  valuable,  services 
often  rendered  by  the  quasi-independent  bodies 
called  Partisan  Corps  ;  services  usually  requi 
ring  great  celerity  of  movement. 

6.  This  kind  of  force  being  "the  eyes  and 
ears  of  an  army,"  it  often  contributes  powerful 
ly  to  the  success  of  strategic  operations. 

In  the  campaign  of  1813,  Napoleon  com 
plained  that,  for  want  of  light  cavalry,  he  could 
get  no  intelligence  of  the  enemy' s  movements. 

So,  in  the  rebel  campaign  of  1863,  culmina 
ting  at  Gettysburg,  General  Lee  attributed  his 
ignorance  of  our  position  and  movements,  which 
led  to  the  failure  of  his  operations,  to  his  being 


132      TACTICAL   USE   OF   THE   THREE  ARMS. 

destitute  of  this  arm  ;  Stuart' s  cavalry,  on  which 
he  depended  for  information,  having  got  too  far 
away  from  him. 

In  Pope's  campaign  in  1862,  the  rebels,  by 
" their  cavalry  raid  on  Catlett'  s  Station,  obtained 
possession  of  the  commanding  general's  corre 
spondence,  plans,  and  orders  from  Washing 
ton. 

On  the  other  hand,  whilst  keeping  ns  in 
formed  of  the  enemy's  movements,  an  abundant 
light  cavalry,  active  and  well  commanded,  may 
be  so  used  as  to  constitute  an  impenetrable 
screen  of  our  own  movements  from  the  enemy, 
as  effectual  as  would  be  a  lofty  and  impassable 
mountain  range. 

Again,  if  we  are  greatly  inferior  to  the  enemy 
in  cavalry,  our  own  cavalry  will  have  to  keep 
itself  within  our  infantry  lines ;  and  the  conse 
quence  will  be  that  the  enemy  will  obtain  con 
trol  of  the  entire  country  around  us,  and  so 
deprive  us  of  all  the  supplies  it  contains. 

As,  besides  this,  cavalry  is  absolutely  neces 
sary  for  the  protection  of  convoys,  and,  from  its 
celerity  of  movement,  is  the  kind  of  force  best 
fitted  for  guarding  our  communications,  it  is 
evident  that  the  subsistence  of  an  army  is  de 
pendent,  to  a  great  extent,  upon  this  arm. 


TACTICAL   USE   OF   CAVALRY.  133 

From  what  has  been  said  in  relation  to  the 
three  arms,  it  is  evident— 

1.  That  ARTILLERY,  within  the  range  of  its 
fire,  is  powerful  in  preventing  the  enemy's  ap 
proach  to  it ;  but,  only  to  a  limited  extent,  can 
pursue  and  drive  the  enemy  from  his  position  ; 
and  that  its  function  is,  therefore,  mainly  DE 
FENSIVE. 

2.  That  CAVALRY,  by  the  impetuosity  of  its 
charge,  is  peculiarly  fit  for  driving  the  enemy 
from  his  position ;   but,  remaining  in  position 
itself,  has  but  feeble  power  to  prevent  the  ene 
my'  s  approaching  it ;  and  this,  only  by  its  car 
bine  and  pistol  fire,  which  is  far  from  effective  ; 
and  that  its  function  is,  therefore,  mainly  OF 
FENSIVE, 

3.  That  INFANTRY  has  great  power,  both  in 
keeping  the  enemy  at  a  distance  by  its  fire  and 
in  driving  him  from  his  position  with  the  bayo 
net  ;  and  that  this  arm  is,  therefore,  both  OF 
FENSIVE  and  DEFENSIVE. 

4.  That  although  artillery  is  mainly  a  defen 
sive  arm,  it  plays  an  important  offensive  part  in 
the  powerful  assistance  it  renders  to  infantry, 
in    shattering   and   disorganizing   the    enemy's 
masses  ;   thereby  opening  the  way  for  our  at 
tacking  columns. 


134       TACTICAL   USE   OF   THE  THREE   ARMS. 

5.  That  although  cavalry  is  mainly  an  offen 
sive  arm,  its  defensive  value  is  also  very  great 
in  the  protection  it  affords,  in  various  emergen 
cies,  to  the  other  arms,  by  its  actual  charge,  or 
"by  its  threatening  position. 

The  special  parts  usually  played  in  battle  by 
the  three  arms  respectively,  may  be  briefly 
stated  thus  :— 

Artillery  prepares  the  victory ; 

Infantry  achieves  it ; 

Cavalry  completes  it,  and  secures  its  fruits. 


THE  END. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPARTMENT 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


3  1979 

v 


LD21-35m-8,'72 
(Q4189S10)476 — A-32 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


863956 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


WSH«:^ 


-M^ 
?MW 


